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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Article proposes various moves for simplification of the task 
of computing the tax base under the individual income tax,1 with a 
principal view of making the income tax capable of compliance by 
“ordinary” individuals without the aid of tax preparation software or 
outside assistance.2  
 Part II offers a brief overview of the pros and cons of simplification 
as a reform agenda or project. Part III deals with simplification 
moves that can be carried out independently of conventional tax re-
form proposals. Part IV considers simplification benefits that are at-
tendant upon plausible tax reform (or revenue-raising) proposals. 
Part V offers some concluding remarks. 
II.   SIMPLIFICATION AS AN AGENDA 
 An obvious aim of simplifying the federal income tax is to save on 
taxpayer compliance costs, especially time spent on filling out tax 
returns. It is reported that individual taxpayers spend not insignifi-
cant amounts of money and more than twenty-four hours on filing 
federal tax returns.3 Such short-form tax returns as currently exist, 
the Form 1040-EZ and the Form 1040-A, do not appear to simplify 
matters significantly because taxpayers would still need to consider 
 1. Simplification of rate structures (such as moving to a flat rate system) is not a 
“simplification” issue, since applying a tiered rate structure to the tax base is a simple 
arithmetic operation easily performed by a computer, including a program found on a web-
site. Complexity in the rate structure should be equated with lack of transparency (dis-
guised changes in marginal rates), such as occur with the deduction phase-out provisions 
found in I.R.C §§ 68 and 151(d)(3), both of which were revived by the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). 
 2. Previous collections of simplification proposals are found in AM. LAW INST. ET AL., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION (Charles H. Gustafson ed., 1979); STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX 
SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Comm. Print 2001).  
 3. William Gale & Benjamin Harris, Tax Simplification: How Costly Is Complexity?, 
TAX POLICY CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/improve/simplification/ 
cost.cfm (last updated Dec. 14, 2007) (reporting and extrapolating from other studies). 
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items omitted from these returns in order to determine eligibility to 
file them.4 Computerized tax preparation services save on computa-
tion time (at a cost), but still require the entering of all relevant data 
and (often) the plowing through of checklists relating to numerous 
obscure deductions and tax credits. Ownership of rental property (or 
property partly devoted to business use) alone adds significantly to 
taxpayer burdens.5 Complex and data-heavy tax returns also place 
burdens on government enforcement agencies.  
 A second aim of simplification is to render taxpayers’ perception of 
the federal income tax as being internally coherent, and not as a 
Christmas tree showering an array of goodies (and baddies) to the 
highest (and lowest) bidders. Simplification is offered here as a “good 
government” project that would increase taxpayer morale and com-
pliance rates through improved transparency and comprehensibility.  
 A third aim would be to reduce dispute-resolution costs. The way 
to further this aim is to clarify borderlines and reduce (where possi-
ble) the necessity for factual inquiries.  
 The opposite of simplification is complexity, and complexity in 
turn partly results from the dynamics of political economy, which 
produces a legislative output wherein it is easier to deliver govern-
ment programs through the tax system (sometimes referred to as 
“tax expenditure” provisions) as opposed to the “normal” means of 
direct federal subsidies or regulation. Politics also dictates that pro-
visions benefitting political constituencies be numerous (perhaps to 
the point of overlap and duplication) and salient,6 whereas provisions 
cutting back on taxpayer benefits be obscure and backhanded.7 Addi-
 4. The Form 1040-EZ is for joint and single filers with no dependents, who have no 
investment income (other than up to $1500 of interest income), no business, rent, or royalty 
income, and who do not itemize. Form 1040EZ: Income Tax Return for Single and Joint 
Filers with No Dependents, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2012), available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040ez.pdf. The Form 1040-EZ includes a line for the earned in-
come credit (EIC), which requires a worksheet computation. Id. The Form 1040-A is a two 
page form that resembles the Form 1040 but with no schedules (except possibly Schedule B 
and Schedule 8812) and certain deductions and credits omitted. Form 1040A: U.S. Individ-
ual Income Tax Return, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2012), available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040a.pdf. These forms may lull taxpayers into ignoring relevant 
items (income, deductions, and credits) that should be reported and which might well re-
duce net tax liability.   
 5. Such property entails computation of depreciation, allocation of deductions to 
rental or business activity, and disallowance (or limitation) under I.R.C. §§ 183, 280A, 
280F, 465, 469.  
 6. For a public choice theory “take” on tax legislation, see Richard L. Doernberg & 
Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987) (book review). 
 7. For example, instead of repealing the itemized deductions, said deductions are 
diluted by floors (see I.R.C. §§ 67, 165(h), 213(a)), ceilings (see id. § 170(b)), phase-outs (see 
id. § 68), and overlays (the Alternative Minimum Tax, see id. §§ 55(a), 56(b)(1)). See also 
statutes cited supra note 5 for provisions diluting deductions with regard to rental or busi-
ness use of property. 
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tionally, certain groups possess a vested interest in tax complexity.8 
This Article, however, does not address the political obstacles to sim-
plification. Nevertheless, certain simplification measures proposed 
herein might be immune from one or more of the political dynamics 
just described. 
 At the technical level, complexity in tax is mostly driven by a faith 
in “accuracy.” Accuracy is in part a function of one’s preferred concept 
of income. Thus, if one thinks that “income” requires adjustment for 
such items as sales taxes, casualty losses, medical expenses, unreal-
ized gains and losses, imputed income, and off-market benefits, then 
the computation of the tax base becomes more complex than in the 
absence of such adjustments. Many of these adjustments are justified 
under the framework of welfare economics (“welfarism”), which posits 
that the tax base should be adjusted directly or indirectly (through 
proxies) for non-market changes in individual utility or well-being. 
However, a comprehensive welfarist tax system is impossible (apart 
from political resistance to a welfarist state), because welfarism ul-
timately refers to individual subjectivity. Determinations of subjec-
tive states entail enormous transaction costs and are unreliable. 
Proxies for subjective states are crude and insufficient. Finally, wel-
farist adjustments to the tax base are piecemeal.9 A partial and 
flawed welfarist tax base must be unfair in terms of taxing “likes” 
(even in terms of well-being) alike.  
 Accuracy also entails a belief that even realized changes in wealth 
can be accurately accounted for, i.e., that capital expenditures can be 
distinguished from expenses, that depreciation and capital recovery 
can be accurately measured, that costs of income production can be 
distinguished from costs of personal consumption, and that accrual 
accounting is more accurate than cash accounting.10 The mere list of 
these issues conjures up complex Code provisions and issues of a fac-
tual nature that are frequently disputed and litigated.  
 8. See Liz Day, How Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple Tax Filing, PROPUBLI-
CA (Mar. 26, 2013, 4:00 A.M.), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-of-
turbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing; Evan Halper, Maker of Tax Software Opposes State 
Filing Help; The Government’s Offer to Fill Out Forms Is a Hit with Poor and Elderly, but 
Not with Intuit, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A1. 
 9. The exclusion for physical personal injuries, I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), is a good example 
of a piecemeal welfarist tax provision, tied to the objective fact of a monetary recovery. 
Non-compensated injuries do not (and practically could not) give rise to reductions in the 
tax base. 
 10. Accounting for changes in wealth could, in theory, be rendered accurate under a 
mark-to-market (“accretion”) income tax, but only if valuation itself is accurate—an unat-
tainable goal. In the case of unique assets, accurate valuation is an illusion: only an actual 
sale can reveal what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller. An accretion income tax 
does not exist anywhere on the globe, and the chance that it would be enacted in the Unit-
ed States appears remote. 
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 At some point, accuracy is not worth the effort.11 Simplicity re-
quires that the individual income tax base be constituted by objective 
outcomes (not estimates or conjectures) that can be attributed to in-
dividual taxpayers without government intrusions into personal pri-
vacy. That is, market transactions (outcomes) should be the data set 
for figuring the tax base of individuals.  
 Simplicity also possesses a cognitive aspect, as distinguished from 
a mechanical aspect. What is desirable is an internally coherent tax 
base principle that relates to the taxation function of raising revenue. 
The principle should be graspable by non-sophisticated individual 
taxpayers. The principle that is most compatible with mechanical 
and cognitive simplicity—as well as substantive tax fairness—is 
what I call “objective ability to pay” (as distinguished from a “utility” 
concept of sacrifice), determinable on an annual basis. This principle 
translates into an income tax base constituted by net realized in-
creases in wealth (disregarding realized decreases in wealth that are 
not costs of income production). However, the task of justifying and 
elaborating upon the concept of an objective ability-to-pay tax base is 
a separate project in itself, and accordingly this Article will generally 
attempt to maintain a primary focus of simplification without push-
ing a particular tax reform agenda. 
III.   SIMPLIFICATION WITHOUT REFORM 
 The proposals discussed below do not, in the main, entail signifi-
cant policy or revenue-driven changes. Familiar “tax reform” options 
that would advance the simplification agenda are discussed in Part 
IV. Items that appear to serve no purpose at all are discussed in    
this Part. 
A.   Taxpayer Relief from Arithmetic  
 Since the IRS performs the necessary calculations in reviewing 
returns, taxpayers should be allowed to forego this task (in whole or 
in part), if they so desire. A taxpayer would be allowed to attempt the 
calculations herself for informational purposes.12  
 11. See generally Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 61 (1998) (assuming that accuracy entails complexity, and providing frame-
work for a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy). 
 12. A more comprehensive version of this approach is the pro-forma return; the gov-
ernment itself prepares a tax return, reviewable by the taxpayer, in which all known third-
party data is entered, with the government performing the tax calculation. See, e.g., Joseph 
Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The California ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 
1431 (2005). 
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B.   Checklists for Tax-Benefits Eligibility Requirements 
 Where possible, the eligibility requirements for a tax benefit 
should take the form of a checklist allowing a “yes” or “no” answer for 
each eligibility requirement. These checklists would mostly be locat-
ed in the instructions to the Form 1040 and other schedules and 
forms, and would render these instructions more user-friendly.  
C.   Tax Credits to be “Off Tax” 
 Tax credits for individuals (other than the foreign tax credit and 
credits for income taxes already paid by the taxpayer) are govern-
ment subsidies. As subsidies delivered by the IRS, these credits 
should be dealt with on a separate page of the return or otherwise 
clearly separated (or even detached) from the tax calculation itself. 
Subsidy-type credits should not be labeled as “reductions in tax lia-
bility” or “tax credits,” but instead they should be called “federal gov-
ernment payments” that happen to be obtainable as an adjunct to 
filing a federal income tax return. 
 Additions to tax liability can take the form of other federal taxes, 
tax-related interest, fines, penalties, and refunds of excessive tax 
credits,13 and should be similarly segregated from the computation of 
the income tax.  
D.   Rate Schedules 
 Since the rates and brackets involve political decisions, no opinion 
is advanced herein as to the rate schedules themselves. Nevertheless, 
it can be observed that moving to a single rate (or to fewer rate 
brackets) is not, by and large, a significant simplification move in it-
self, especially if taxpayers are not required to perform calculations.  
E.   Subsistence Income 
 Subsistence income should not be taxed,14 but exempting subsist-
ence income can be done in a much simpler fashion than under cur-
rent law. Since subsistence levels appear to vary only with the size of 
a household, a simple table could be designed to set out the subsist-
ence allowance per size of household. 
 13. Additions to tax are labeled “Other Taxes” on page 2 of the Form 1040. Form 
1040A: U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, supra note 4, at 2. 
 14. Income up to the subsistence level is unable to contribute to the government under 
liberal political theory. The centerpiece of a super-simplification proposal made in Michael 
J. Graetz, Essay, Taxes That Work: A Simple American Plan, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1043 (2006), 
is to raise the exemption level of the income tax far above the subsistence level to $100,000 
(or more) and to make up the lost revenue through a value-added tax, which is a tax on 
business activity. This Article assumes that no significant new federal tax would be enact-
ed, so that simplification would be confined to the individual income tax, where the notion 
of off-the-bottom allowances has been widely accepted. 
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1.   Eliminate the Standard Deduction 
 The standard deduction (roughly $6000 per individual)15 serves 
two purposes that can be better carried out separately. The first 
function is to constitute, along with the personal exemption (roughly 
$4000 per individual),16 a universal low-income allowance; but this 
function can be better served by increasing the personal exemption 
itself. The second function is to provide a floor under “itemized de-
ductions” as a group,17 which (1) eases accounting burdens and (2) 
avoids duplication with the off-the-bottom allowances. However,    
this function can be performed better by separate floors under       
certain deductions. 
2.   The Personal Exemption Amount 
 The personal exemption amount should approximate the subsist-
ence level of income for a household consisting of one individual. A 
starting point for calculating subsistence levels is the official poverty 
level, but that amount could be rounded up and adjusted to take into 
account such universal costs as state, local, and gasoline taxes and 
the cost of medical care. A reasonable figure (for 2014) might be 
$12,000 for an unmarried individual. 
 An issue is what the personal exemption amount should be for 
married couples under the present system, which allows married 
couples to file joint returns for aggregate taxable income. Statistics 
indicate that the subsistence level is a function of the number of per-
sons in a common household, and does not depend on the age of 
household members or whether the “second” member of the house-
hold is married to the “first” member.18 Proceeding on the (optimistic) 
assumption that the tax law is to be adapted to the household con-
cept, then, if the personal exemption for an individual is set at 
 15. The standard deduction for 2013 eliminated tax on the first $12,200 of taxable 
income for a married couple filing jointly, $6100 for an unmarried individual (or married 
person filing separately), and $8950 for a “head of household.” Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 
I.R.B. 444, 447-48. 
 16. In 2013, the personal (and dependency) exemption amount was $3900 per individ-
ual. Id. at 448. Both the standard deduction amounts and the personal (and dependency) 
exemption amounts are indexed for inflation, resulting in increased amounts from year to 
year.  
 17. An individual takes the greater of (1) the standard deduction, see I.R.C. § 63(c), or 
(2) aggregate allowable itemized deductions, but not both. Id. § 63(b). The term “itemized 
deductions” means deductions other than (1) the standard deduction, (2) deductions listed 
in § 62 that are taken in arriving at adjusted gross income, and (3) the deductions for per-
sonal and dependency exemptions allowed by § 151. Id. § 63(d). 
 18. For 2013, the official (rounded off) poverty level as determined by the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services was $11,490 for an individual, increasing by 
roughly $4800 for each additional family member. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty 
Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182-83 (Jan. 24, 2013).  
                                                                                                                  
2013]  SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS 79 
 
$12,000, a reasonable figure for a married couple living together 
would be $18,000. 
 The scheme suggested immediately above might be politically “off 
the table” on the ground that it would be perceived as reintroducing a 
marriage penalty,19 but this perception would be inaccurate if un-
married, committed couples occupying the same household were 
treated as being married.20 In any event, if it is politically necessary 
that the personal exemptions for a married couple be twice that of an 
unmarried individual, plausible exemption amounts for 2013 would 
be in the neighborhood of $20,000 for a married couple and $10,000 
for an unmarried person. 
3.   Dependency Exemption Amounts 
 The purpose of the dependency exemption is to allow for the costs 
of supporting dependents. Accordingly, the dependency exemption 
should be a lesser amount than the augmented personal exemption 
for a single-person household, because the dependent is free of hav-
ing to maintain a household. The current dependency exemption 
amount (roughly $4000) is almost the same as what the poverty-level 
statistics suggest is appropriate, but (again) the poverty level amount 
would only be a starting place for obtaining an appropriate figure.21 
 A person claimed as a dependent by another should have a zero 
personal exemption. A personal exemption on top of the income ex-
clusion for support received by the dependent entails a double tax 
benefit for subsistence to the same taxpayer. The dependency exemp-
tion, coupled with the exclusion for support received and the loss of 
the dependent’s personal exemption, effectively shifts the depend-
ent’s tax existence to that of the support provider, except for the de-
pendent’s separate economic activity. 
4.   The Definition of “Dependent” 
 The tests for determining “dependent” status that involve “support 
provided” (by the dependent or the claimant, as the case may be), 
relative to total support,22 are unworkable.23 The relevant distinction 
 19. Currently, the standard deduction for a married couple is twice that for an un-
married individual. See supra note 15. 
 20. Two unmarried taxpayers maintaining separate households would have aggregate 
personal exemptions of approximately $18,000, but that would presumably be justified by 
the fact that separate households are being maintained. 
 21. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, supra note 18, at 5183. 
 22. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(D) (“qualifying child” must not provide more than one-half of 
own support), (d)(1)(C) (“qualifying relative” must receive more than one-half of support 
from claimant). 
 23. Support for this purpose includes economic resources that are not gross income 
and that often take the form of in-kind room, board, and other items, and exclude items 
that are not spent on living costs. These facts are intrinsically hard to ascertain, are not 
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should be between dependents living in the taxpayer’s household 
(“household dependents”) and those that are not (“other depend-
ents”). A person living in the taxpayer’s household should be deemed 
to be a household dependent24 unless she (a) is not within a specified 
degree of relationship (or registered domestic partner),25 or (b) has 
“income” above a certain threshold amount.26 For this purpose, the 
income threshold amount should be an amount greater than the de-
pendency exemption amount, but certainly not greater than the per-
sonal exemption amount. 
 To be an “other dependent,” the person should be required to satis-
fy a somewhat stringent “relationship” test. Additionally, the claim-
ant must have provided, by cash transfers or payments,27 an amount 
that exceeds the greater of the exemption amount or the putative de-
pendent’s “income.” Finally, the person would be disqualified if (a) 
she is an owner of her place of abode or (b) her “income” exceeds the 
personal exemption amount. 
 An issue is how “income” should be defined for each category of 
dependent. A possible construct would be “adjusted gross income” 
(AGI), plus the untaxed portion of Social Security retirement benefits 
and excluded interest, personal injury recoveries, non-taxable distri-
butions from trusts and estates, and amounts received on account    
of disability. 
5.   Eliminate the Child Tax Credit 
 This ($1000 per qualifying child) tax credit,28 which appears to be 
simple on its face, is complicated by phase-out rules, the linking of 
refundability to the taxpayer’s earned income over $3000, and its in-
teraction with other tax credits. The purported rationale is to aug-
ment the dependency exemptions (but only for children under the age 
of seventeen living in the taxpayer’s household),29 but circumstantial 
public, and cannot be provided by disinterested third parties. 
 24. The idea is that the claimant should be deemed to have supplied value at least 
equal to the dependency exemption amount. 
 25. The purpose here is to weed out persons who cohabit for convenience or pleasure. 
 26. The purpose here is to weed out persons who are basically self-supporting.  
 27. If the taxpayer allows the putative dependent to live in a dwelling owned by the 
taxpayer (other than the taxpayer’s residence), the taxpayer can be deemed to have spent 
cash on the dependent at the rate of, say, 5% of the dwelling’s cost. 
 28. I.R.C. § 24(c).  
 29. The legislative history states only: 
The Committee believes that the individual income tax structure does not re-
duce tax liability by enough to reflect a family’s reduced ability to pay taxes as 
family size increases. In part, this is because over the last 50 years the value of 
the dependent personal exemption has declined in real terms by over one-third. 
The Committee believes that a tax credit for families with dependent children 
will reduce the individual income tax burden of those families, will better rec-
ognize the financial responsibilities of raising dependent children, and will 
                                                                                                                  
2013]  SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS 81 
 
evidence suggests that this credit is a kind of federal “workfare” sup-
plement for the working poor with dependent children.30 The credit is 
a wasteful squandering of government revenues to the extent that it 
does not allow for, or subsidize, incremental costs of child care. The 
aims of this credit can better be accomplished by (1) aligning the de-
pendency exemption amount with the amount necessary to support a 
household dependent31 and (2) providing tax credit(s) for the working 
poor with children.32 
F.   The Working Poor 
1.   No Separate Rate Schedules for Unmarried Individuals and 
Heads of Household 
 The existing system providing for four categories of filing status 
can be easily reduced to two, namely, married couples filing jointly 
and everyone else.  
 The current rate schedule for an unmarried individual is the same 
as for a married person filing separately up to a taxable income of 
about $75,000, but, above that level, two unmarried persons with 
evenly split incomes (and living together) pay less tax than a married 
couple filing jointly having the same aggregate income.33 This dispar-
ity could influence marriage decisions of high-income couples. The 
disparity is presumably based on economies of scale available to mar-
ried couples. However, marriage status is an extremely crude indica-
tor of economies of scale. Moreover, it is hard to justify implicit (in-
cremental) cost-of-living allowances at high-income levels. Indeed, 
cost-of-living differentials that result from taxpayer choice, apart 
from being inscrutable to being measured on a case-by-case basis, 
promote family values. 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 310 (1997). The stated rationale suggests a deduction rather 
than a credit. The credit has since been liberalized so as to be available for a “qualifying 
child” (the taxpayer’s descendant, sibling, or sibling’s descendant) living in the taxpayer’s 
household but under the age of seventeen. See I.R.C. § 24(c)(1) (referencing id. § 152(c)). 
 30. The existing federal cash-transfer program for families with dependent children is 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which replaced the Aid for Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program in 1997, the same year that the child tax credit was enacted. See 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105. TANF is designed to encourage welfare recipients to enter the work-
force, and the child tax credit is refundable only if (and as) earned income (wages) exceeds 
$3000. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); I.R.C. § 24(d)(1), (d)(4). Since the benefit level of TANF 
is largely decided by the states, the child tax credit amounts to a federal supplement to 
TANF. 
 31. See supra pp. 6-7. 
 32. See infra pp. 8-11. 
 33. See I.R.C. § 1(c), (d), (f)(8), and the rate tables for 2013, published in Rev. Proc. 
2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 445 (showing a divergence above a taxable income amount of 
$73,200). 
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should (arguably) not be taken into account at all.34 Certainly, any 
adjustments of this sort would complicate the system. Thus, the rate 
schedule for unmarried persons—which has already been partially 
repealed—should be wholly eliminated, so that the same rate sched-
ule would apply both to unmarried individuals and to married indi-
viduals filing separately. 
 A head of household is an unmarried individual with one or more 
dependents living at home.35 Both the head-of-household rate sched-
ule36 and the head-of-household standard deduction37 are more favor-
able than that of an unmarried individual (but not as favorable as for 
a married couple filing jointly). No reason exists for taxing upper-
middle-class (and wealthy) individuals at favorable rates just because 
they have one or more live-at-home dependents, or for why the first 
dependency exemption should (in effect) be significantly greater for 
an unmarried person with a live-at-home-dependent relative to other 
taxpayers with a dependent.38 The legitimate aim of the special rate 
schedule to account for incremental work and child-care costs can be 
better accomplished by some increase in the dependency exemptions 
and a tax allowance for working taxpayers with live-at-home depend-
ents (see item 3 below).  
2.   Replace the Child Tax Credit, the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
and the Household and Dependent Care Credit with a Single De-
pendent Care Allowance  
 The child tax credit is not linked to any costs of child care over 
and above the routine support that is already deducted by reason of 
the dependency exemptions.39 The earned income credit (EIC)40 is 
extremely complex and serves two goals—refunding part of the pay-
roll tax and subsidizing the working poor with dependents—that can 
better be accomplished separately. The household and dependent 
care credit41 has a clear enough purpose, but it (uniquely) requires 
 34. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Inequities in Cost of Living Adjustments, 28 A.B.A. 
SECT. TAX’N NEWS Q. 24 (2009); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the 
Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977). In 
welfarist terms, adjustments for higher costs of living are incoherent, because the incre-
mental monetary costs are incurred voluntarily to obtain higher non-monetary benefits. 
 35. I.R.C. § 2(b). 
 36. Id. § 1(b). 
 37. The head-of-household standard deduction is $8950 for 2013, compared to $6100 
for other individuals. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 448 (2013). 
 38. A non-itemizing head of household with one dependent effectively obtains approx-
imately an extra $3000 of allowance off the bottom relative to other taxpayers (for 2013, 
the precise amount is $2850, the difference between standard deductions of $8950 and 
$6100). See id. 
 39. Thus, single-earner couples obtain a windfall: a subsidy for non-existent (or wholly 
discretionary) expenses, such as private schooling. 
 40. I.R.C. § 32. 
 41. Id. § 21. 
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accounting for eligible costs, confers an unwarranted subsidy for 
high-income taxpayers while (as a nonrefundable credit) being use-
less for low income individuals, and is overly broad in allowing tax 
benefits for discretionary personal household expenses (e.g., house-
keeping costs). All of these credits are keyed to wage income while 
being subject to phase-out or cut-back rules, indicating that they are 
aimed at those low-to-moderate income households with a wage-
earner and live-at-home dependents. The phase-out rules for the EIC 
are especially complex and kick in at low amounts of earned income 
(or AGI), rendering compliance difficult for that portion of the popu-
lation that is likely to be poorly educated. 
 First, a refundable credit should be available for wage earners 
equal to the Social Security tax rate (currently 6.2%) times earned 
income up to, say, $10,000, for a maximum credit of $620.42 This cred-
it (the Wage Earner Credit, or WEC) would not be conditioned on 
having household dependents, but would be subject to the same 
phase-out rule as the Household Dependent Allowance (HDA),       
described below. 
 Since dependency exemptions would already allow for the “nor-
mal” cost of supporting dependents, any additional tax benefits 
should be keyed to the incremental costs of caring for household de-
pendents where the taxpayer is unable to provide the care herself by 
reason of being disabled or employed.43 Thus, to be eligible for this 
allowance (the HDA), the taxpayer must be disabled or a full-time 
student, or must have worked more than, say, 1200 hours during the 
year. If the eligible taxpayer is married (broadly defined), the spouse 
must be disabled, a full-time student, or must also have worked the 
same minimum total hours. Additionally, the taxpayer must have at 
least one dependent living at home for more than, say, half the year. 
The live-at-home dependent should occupy a specified degree of rela-
tionship to the taxpayer and be under a certain age, disabled, or over 
a certain age. 
 Design issues for the HDA abound. First, should the allowance 
take the form of a deduction or a tax credit? In internal-to-tax terms, 
any allowance off the bottom or cost of earning income should take 
the form of a deduction. The opposing view is that the allowance 
should be viewed as a government subsidy for part of the costs of in-
 42. Topic 751 – Social Security and Medicare Withholding Rates, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html (last updated Oct. 23, 2013). This is similar to the 
Making Work Pay credit of I.R.C. § 36A, which has expired. Also, the credit should not 
exceed the Social Security taxes actually paid. 
 43. THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 60 (2005), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-report/TaxPanel_5-7.pdf, proposed a 
Family Credit (without phase-out) for taxpayers with certain amounts or types of income 
and a separate Work Credit (with phase-out). 
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cremental dependent care and that a refundable tax credit delivers a 
uniform subsidy that is not a function of the taxpayer’s marginal tax 
rate. Indeed, a deduction is worthless to a taxpayer having a net in-
come below the “standard” low-income allowances. On the other 
hand, a refundable tax credit requires the filing of a tax return where 
one would not otherwise be required.44 Since the HDA would replace 
tax credits, the HDA would also presumably take the form of a       
tax credit. 
 The eligibility requirements would be a virtual guarantee that eli-
gible costs are incurred. Therefore, it would not be necessary to ac-
count for actual costs of incremental dependent care. Accordingly, an 
eligible taxpayer would be entitled to a refundable tax credit of, say, 
$6000 (40% of $15,000) for the first eligible dependent, with decreas-
ing amounts for a second dependent (say, $4000), and third depend-
ent (say, $2000). A credit of $6000 compares with the sum of: (1) a 
child tax credit of $1000, (2) a household and dependent care credit of 
$3000,45 and (3) a $3250 (in 2013) credit for the first dependent under 
the EIC.46  
 Both the HDA and the WEC should be phased out at a uniform 
rate above, say, $50,000 of AGI.47  
G.   The Taxable Income Computation 
 The task of calculating the taxable income of individual taxpayers 
is unnecessarily convoluted and can be simplified under the pro-
posals set forth below. 
1.   Equal Status Among Deductions 
 The distinctions among various categories of deductions (§ 62 de-
ductions, itemized deductions, and miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions)48 pose unnecessary (and confusing) line-drawing issues, com-
plicate the taxable income computation,49 and obfuscate the simple 
notion that taxable income equals gross income less deductions. 
 44. An individual income tax return is required only if gross income exceeds the sum 
of the personal exemption amount and the standard deduction amount. I.R.C. § 6012.  
 45. Id. § 21(c). This credit cannot exceed $6000 in the aggregate, however. 
 46. Id. § 32(b). In 2013, the maximum incremental credit for a second dependent was 
$2122 and for a third dependent was $672, but no additional amounts were allowed for 
additional dependents. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 445 (maximum EIC for a 
taxpayer with one, two, or three qualified children). 
 47. Taxpayers with substantial income have the option of providing home care them-
selves. Stated differently, above a certain income level, paying for dependent care becomes 
a lifestyle choice. Finally, if the allowance takes the form of a tax credit, then it is wasteful 
to subsidize taxpayers with substantial incomes.  
 48. I.R.C. §§ 62(a), 63(d) (itemized deductions), 67(b) (miscellaneous itemized        
deductions).  
 49. Aggregate miscellaneous itemized deductions are subject to a 2% floor, id. § 67(a), 
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 As noted above, the standard deduction would be removed, elimi-
nating a major reason for having a separate category of itemized de-
ductions. All deductions (including the personal and dependency ex-
emptions) would be allowed in full, without phase-out rules. Floors 
and ceilings would attach only to certain specified deductions. Such 
floors and ceilings would be computed with reference to “net income,” 
meaning gross income reduced by the deductions (other than the per-
sonal and dependency exemptions) not subject to any floor.  
2.   Personal Deductions Subject to Floors 
 The purpose of the floors under the personal deductions is to elim-
inate duplication with costs already deemed to be covered by the per-
sonal and dependency exemptions, so that only extraordinary costs 
within a certain category are eligible for additional deduction. Floors 
already exist under the deductions for personal casualty losses50 and 
for medical expenses.51 It is appropriate to consider a floor under 
each of the remaining personal deductions, but the issues of repeal of 
and/or floors under the personal deductions are deferred to Part IV. 
 3.   Deduction Phase-Out Rules  
 Deduction phase-outs create hidden tax rate bubbles that lack 
transparency and cannot be justified under any theory of progressivi-
ty.52 Deduction phase-outs require the filling out of a worksheet. In 
contrast, tax credits that are subsidies for the non-wealthy are ap-
propriately circumscribed by phase-outs. It is not inappropriate to 
require a taxpayer eligible for a government subsidy to expend some 
effort to obtain it. 
4.   The Proper Function of the AMT 
 The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was originally designed to 
reach high-income taxpayers who paid no or little tax on account of 
“excess” deductions.53 The current AMT appears to be a kind of ad 
hoc revenue raiser that bears no relationship to any normative con-
cept of income, but instead, for most individual taxpayers, operates 
as a sort of “stealth” partial repeal of certain itemized deductions.54 
and itemized deductions are subject to a phase-out rule (up to 80% thereof), id. § 68, as well 
as being effectively disallowed unless the aggregate amount thereof exceeds the standard 
deduction. See Form 1040A: U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, supra note 4. 
 50. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h).  
 51. Id. § 213.  
 52. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, 126 Stat. 2313 
(2013), revived phase-out rules for the personal and dependency exemptions, I.R.C. 
§ 151(d)(3), and for aggregate itemized deductions, id. § 68. 
 53. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 4628 (1969). 
 54. The AMT disallows, inter alia, the standard deduction, personal and dependency 
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On the merits, if a deduction is justified in the first place—
particularly as it records a reduction in a taxpayer’s ability to pay—
no justification exists for reducing or eliminating the deduction ex-
plicitly or implicitly. The same end can be attained by other (and 
more transparent) means, such as the repeal of unwarranted deduc-
tions, the imposition of floors, and the foreclosing of avenues of 
abuse, as is considered in Part IV. Ceilings appear to be appropriate 
only in the case of wholly “discretionary” personal deductions, but the 
only such deduction that is truly discretionary appears to be the 
charitable deduction,55 which is already subject to a ceiling.56 
 The AMT could be reformed to better accord with its original pur-
pose,57 but that is not a simplification issue. 
H.   Social Security Retirement Benefits 
 The existing rules governing the inclusion in income of Social Se-
curity retirement benefits58 are so complex that a worksheet is       
required to figure out the taxable amount.59 Also, the rules appear    
to be disconnected from any theory of partial exclusion. Yet a         
taxable amount can be figured by viewing the benefits as entailing    
a recovery of (all or a portion of)60 nondeductible contributions (Social 
Security taxes).61 A person’s contribution history is contained in com-
puterized records of the Social Security Administration (SSA), and 
this history is periodically mailed to individuals eligible to receive                
retirement benefits. 
exemptions, state and local taxes, allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions, interest on 
home equity loans, and a portion of the medical expense deduction. See I.R.C. § 56(b). The 
first two of these are a trade-off for the generous AMT exemption amounts (in 2013, 
$80,800 for married couples filing jointly and $51,900 for unmarried individuals), I.R.S. 
News Release IR-2013-4 (Jan. 11, 2013); but perhaps the exemption amounts should be 
raised somewhat. For a critique of the AMT, see Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While 
Middle America Burns: Amending the AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811 (2004). 
 55. I.R.C. § 170. Self-inflicted casualty losses are not deductible at all, id. § 165(h)(4), 
the mortgage interest deduction is limited to two residences (and contains ceilings on prin-
cipal debt), id. §§ 67(b), 163(h)(4), and the medical expense deduction excludes costs of 
most cosmetic surgery, id. § 213(d)(9). Nevertheless, further restrictions on abuse of these 
deductions are considered infra Part IV. 
 56. Id. § 170(b). 
 57. The current AMT disallows the exclusion for the exercise of “incentive stock op-
tions” but leaves out of account the capital gains preference (which currently is neither an 
exclusion nor a deduction), as well as § 103 (tax-exempt) interest (except with respect to 
private activity bonds). Id. § 56(b)(3). 
 58. Id. § 86. 
 59. Form 1040: Social Security Benefits Worksheet—Lines 20a and 20b, IRS.GOV 
(2013), http://apps.irs.gov/app/vita/content/globalmedia/social_security_benefits_worksheet 
_1040i.pdf. 
 60. An issue is whether such basis should be reduced to account for the share of Social 
Security taxes used to fund the Social Security disability program.  
 61. An alternative simplification/reform option would be to allow a deduction for taxes 
paid, with inclusion of the full amount of benefits. This approach would presumably be off 
the table on account of current revenue considerations. 
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 The basis recovery system can be modeled on (a) a recovery-of-
basis-first system, (b) the annuity rules of I.R.C. § 72, or (c) the tax 
treatment accorded to mortgage loans.62 Since the SSA has all the 
requisite information, it would be able to send a computer-generated 
tax information return to both the IRS and the taxpayer indicating 
the taxable portion of benefits. 
I.   Educational Tax Benefits 
 The multiple tax benefits for higher educational expenses various-
ly take the form of deduction, exclusion, tax credit, and exempt 
trust.63 All these provisions contain overlapping definitions of quali-
fied educational expenses,64 and most of them contain needs tests and 
maximum benefit limitations. Those that do not contain needs tests 
and limitations on benefits (the scholarship exclusion and state tui-
tion programs) essentially amount to exclusions for higher education 
obtained at a bargain price. Gift-financed education is tax-free by 
reason of § 102(a).65  
 At a minimum, a universal definition of qualified higher education 
costs should apply for all purposes. Similarly, a universal needs test 
(phase-out for high income taxpayers) should apply in all cases in 
which the tax benefit is contingent on need. 
J.   Borderline Personal/Business Deductions 
 Categorical rules for sorting out borderline tax issues are prefera-
ble, in administrative-efficiency terms, to fact-intensive case-by-case 
determinations. 
1.   Marginal Business and Investment Deductions Generally 
 Current § 67 disallows “miscellaneous itemized deductions” 
(MIDs) to the extent of 2% of AGI.66 An MID is an “itemized deduc-
tion” that is not listed in § 67(b).67 This “anything not on the ap-
proved list” rule has deprived taxpayers of rightful deductions in un-
anticipated circumstances, such as plaintiff transaction costs in ob-
 62. Any unused basis of a deceased individual would carry over to persons receiving 
Social Security survivor benefits. Unused basis would simply expire. 
 63. See I.R.C. §§ 25A (Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits), 117(a) (qualified scholar-
ships), 221 (interest on education loans), 222 (qualified tuition and related expenses), 529 
(qualified tuition plans, known as QTPs), and 530 (Coverdale education savings accounts, 
known as ESAs). Additionally, educational employee fringe benefits are provided for by 
§§ 117(d) and 127. 
 64. QTPs can uniquely provide for room and board costs. Id. § 529(e)(3)(B). ESAs can 
uniquely provide for pre-college education. Id. § 530(b)(2)(A)(ii). These features are hard to 
justify on policy grounds. 
 65. Id. § 102(a). 
 66. Id. § 67(b). 
 67. Id. 
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taining includible damages recoveries and deductions allowed under 
§ 183(b)(2), discussed immediately below.68 Recall that, under the 
proposal offered above, the category of “itemized deduction” would   
be eliminated. 
 Instead, the floor should apply only to those specified deductions 
(as a group) for which Congress deems that the connection of the ex-
pense to income production is tenuous. Leading candidates are unre-
imbursed employee deductions and “investment” deductions that are 
only indirectly connected to income production and that typically in-
volve small amounts. Indeed, to supplement such a percentage-of-
AGI disallowance rule, consideration could be given to simply disal-
lowing small-amount (say, under $200) borderline items, such as 
subscription costs to the Wall Street Journal.69 
2.   Business Meal Costs 
 Costs of consuming food and beverages are inherently personal 
and should be disallowed in full, except where the consumption is 
directly related to an active business of the taxpayer (such as being a 
food critic or a professional food preparer).70 
 In the case of employer-reimbursed business meals, the employer 
is the real spender, and, since it is not consuming the meals itself, 
should not be subject to the existing 50% disallowance rule,71 which 
is meaningless in the case of employers that are exempt from income 
tax. Any perceived abuse in this area can be dealt with by deeming 
reimbursed employee meal costs (perhaps in excess of a specified per 
diem amount) as additional compensation income of the employee. 
3.   Business Lodging Costs 
 Section 162(a)(2) currently allows a deduction for business-related 
“away from home” lodging costs.72 However, the doctrine relating to 
the “away from home” requirement is confused and arbitrary.73 As 
with food and beverage costs, costs of lodging are inherently personal 
and should generally be denied unless clearly justified. One such ex-
ception would be reimbursement by an employer. (However, compen-
sation that is disguised as a reimbursement should be treated as 
 68. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for Structural 
Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 69. Cf. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (allowing casualty losses only to the extent they exceed $100 
per casualty). 
 70. Under current law, 50% of business meal costs are disallowed. Id. § 274(n)(1). 
 71. In an employer-reimbursement situation, the 50% disallowance rule falls on the 
employer, not the employee. See id. § 274(n)(2)(A) (cross-referencing id. § 274(e)(3)).  
 72. Id. §162(a)(2). 
 73. E.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND 
POLICY 256-68 (4th ed. 2012) (describing this doctrine). 
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compensation.) Another would be for core-of-the-business lodging 
costs (say, of a travel writer).74 
 Apart from the foregoing, a business deduction for lodging costs is 
justified insofar as (1) a plausible business reason exists for main-
taining at least one residence at the base location (such as being near 
a place of work that is used for, say, at least sixty days a year), and 
(2) a clear business reason also exists for the away-from-base-location 
lodging. Spouses should be treated as separate taxpayers for this 
purpose. The “second” lodging should be “away from home” in an ob-
jective sense, such as more than 100 miles from both the taxpayer’s 
residence and her business office. These principles should operate to 
ensure that only incremental (or duplicative) business-driven lodging 
costs are deductible.  
 Using these criteria, the outcomes of certain recurring scenarios 
would be resolved as follows: 
 (1) Husband and wife maintain homes in different locations to be 
close to their respective business locations. No deduction would be 
allowed for either residence because no business reason exists for one 
spouse to reside in the other spouse’s residence. 
 (2) Itinerant business (salespersons, pro golfers and tennis play-
ers, entertainers). In most of these cases no business reason exists to 
maintain a “base” home in any particular location, and therefore the 
deduction for lodging costs would be denied. 
 (3) Two business locations of the same taxpayer (ongoing). Here a 
business reason should exist for having separate residential loca-
tions. A ski instructor in Lake Placid should not be able to deduct 
lodging costs in Naples, Florida, with respect to a computer consult-
ing business that could be based anywhere. 
 (4) Non-recurring extended leaves and reassignments. No deduc-
tion should be allowed if the taxpayer’s family accompanies the tax-
payer to the temporary job location, because in that case the taxpayer 
can avoid duplicative housing costs by renting out the first home. 
Otherwise, lodging deductions would be allowed only if (and so long 
as) (1) the taxpayer has not changed employers (or has not been ter-
minated), (2) has not purchased a home in the temporary location, 
and (3) could reasonably expect to return to her base home location at 
the end of the “away” period. However,  “away from home” status 
would expire at the end of the first full calendar year following the 
year of taking up residence at the second location. 
  
  
 74. Such a business might be a not-for-profit activity under I.R.C. § 183, however. 
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 On no account should depreciation be allowed on a taxpayer’s 
principal residence as defined in § 121,75 because depreciation (by re-
ducing basis) creates tax-favored gain.76 
4.   Not-for-Profit Activities 
 Section 183(a) disallows all deductions from “not-for-profit activi-
ties,” but § 183(b)(2) allows deductions to the extent of the income 
from any such activity.77 
(a)   Accounting 
 Under present law, it is necessary to account for the costs giving 
rise to the deductions that initially are allowed by § 183(b)(2), be-
cause at least some § 183(b)(2) deductions are then subject to disal-
lowance as miscellaneous itemized deductions, and depreciation al-
lowed under § 183(b)(2) reduces the basis of taxpayer-owned assets.78 
Accordingly, depreciation must be calculated (and perhaps pro-rated 
between personal and not-for-profit use), and then it needs to be de-
termined what portion of the depreciation is allowed under 
§ 183(b)(2) after considering other deductions allowable under 
§ 183(b)(2).79 Accounting for such depreciation and attendant basis 
reductions is not worth the effort, especially in instances such as 
hunting, fishing, prospecting, amateur artistic ventures, amateur 
inventing, and sporadic renting of personal-use property. 
 Therefore, § 183 should be reconstituted so as to disallow depreci-
ation (and other cost-recovery deductions) completely with respect to 
any asset used in a not-for-profit activity. It follows that no basis ad-
justments would be required for such assets on account of deprecia-
tion (and cost recovery) deductions. Other income-production costs 
would be allowed under § 183(b)(2) up to the amount of gross income 
 75. I.R.C. § 121(a) generally excludes up to $500,000 of gain on a taxpayer’s personal 
residence, defined as a residence that the taxpayer has used as her primary residence for 
730 days (“periods aggregating two years or more”) out of the last five years of ownership. 
However, only gain attributable to principal residence use (after 2008) qualifies for the 
exclusion. See id. § 121(b)(4). This rule renders it difficult to obtain full exclusions for more 
than one residence of a taxpayer. 
 76. Under present law, the depreciation is allowed and the gain resulting from such 
depreciation is included as unrecaptured § 1250 capital gain, subject to a maximum rate of 
25% under § 1(h)(1)(D), rather than as excluded gain. Id. § 121(d)(6). It would be easier to 
disallow the depreciation and forego the basis adjustments. 
 77. Actually, § 183(b)(2) allows deductions that would otherwise require a business or 
investment nexus to the extent that the gross income from the activity exceeds deductions 
(such as property taxes, mortgage interest, and casualty losses allocable to the activity) 
that do not require a business or investment nexus. Id. § 183(b)(2). The principal effect of 
this rule is to remove the personal deductions from the possibility of § 183(a) disallowance. 
The secondary effect is to (possibly) reduce the deductions allowed by § 183(b)(2). 
 78. Id. § 1016(a)(2). 
 79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b). 
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from the activity (reduced by allowable personal deductions). Loss 
carryovers should continue to be disallowed. The net effect of these 
changes would be to simplify accounting greatly under § 183(b). In 
most cases, § 183 would operate to allow the taxpayer simply to ig-
nore income and deductions with respect to not-for-profit activities. 
(b)   Definition of “Not-for-Profit Activity” 
 The category of “not-for-profit activity”—which triggers § 183—
has been often narrowly construed by the courts to allow marginal 
activities to operate as tax shelters.80 The factual nature of the § 183 
inquiry encourages taxpayers to frequently litigate the matter81 with 
the knowledge that penalties are unlikely. The multi-factor test con-
tained in the regulations82 invites unpredictable judging. The      
worst abuses in this area involve real estate used in farming and         
ranching activities.83 
 If the multi-factor approach is retained, § 183 should be amended 
so that the possibility of appreciation in property used in, or which is 
the location of, an activity shall not be taken into account as indicat-
ing a profit motive for the activity being scrutinized. Treating the ap-
preciation potential of an asset used in a marginal activity as indicat-
ing that the activity itself is for profit is to let the tail wag the dog.84 
 Additionally, a stronger standard could be imposed for overriding 
the presumption that an activity generating a series of losses is a 
not-for-profit activity, such as one of “clear and convincing evidence.” 
 An alternative to the “factor” approach would be, as a default rule, 
to treat any activity as a not-for-profit activity if (a) the activity is not 
carried on through a C corporation,85 (b) the activity involves any 
meaningful element of what people normally consider to be pleasure 
or recreation for the taxpayer, or (c) the activity involves use of a 
taxpayer’s residence (a topic separately considered immediately be-
low). Exceptions could be carved out, e.g., for activities that become 
profitable for a certain period, that exceed a certain gross revenue 
amount, that generate losses only because of favorable tax account-
 80. See, e.g., Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659 (1979), acq., 1979-2 C.B. 1; Fields 
v. Commissioner, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 1981-550, at 2114 (1981). 
 81. Annotations of reported § 183 cases occupy seventy-four pages of Standard Feder-
al Tax Reports. See 2013-4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 12,170 at 26,896-969. 
 82. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (listing nine factors). 
 83. Discussions of I.R.C. § 183 are found in ROBERT W. WOOD, 548-2ND TAX MANAGE-
MENT PORTFOLIOS: HOBBY LOSSES (2d ed. 2012); PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION 595-609 (6th ed. 2008). 
 84. Personal use of an appreciation-potential asset has always defeated loss and ex-
pense deductions apart from I.R.C. § 183. See, e.g., Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583 
(2d Cir. 1962). Section 183 was not intended to reverse prior law on this point. See I.R.C. 
§ 183(c). 
 85. Losses of a C corporation are confined to the corporation and do not pass through 
to individual shareholders. 
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ing rules (such as expensing research costs), or that present other 
objective indicators of a serious profit-making intention (such as ac-
quiring technical expertise and serious marketing efforts). 
5.   Rental or Business Use of Personal Residence 
 Section 280A, dealing with business and rental use of a taxpayer’s 
residence, not only potentially overlaps with § 183,86 but it also re-
sembles § 183 as to its operation,87 save for the following variances: 
(1) instead of a for-profit fact test, the triggering mechanism is the 
objective one of non-residential (commercial) use of a taxpayer’s resi-
dence;88 (2) for uses other than certain specified exclusive business 
uses or rental use (for more than fourteen days), deductions (other 
than personal deductions) are wholly disallowed;89 (3) in the case of 
the specified exclusive business uses or rental use, the allowed 
amount is computed in the same way as under § 183 but with further 
disallowance in an amount equal to activity deductions not attributa-
ble to such use, but with carry-forward of disallowed losses;90 (4) cer-
tain rentals of a principal residence escape § 280A;91 and (5), if the 
residence is rented for less than fifteen days, the gross rental income 
is excluded and for-profit deductions disallowed.92 Apart from the 
statutory complexity of § 280A and its overlap with § 183, accounting 
under § 280A is burdensome, and the “exclusive business use” test of 
§ 280A(c)(1) cannot be enforced without governmental intrusions into 
privacy. Residential property subject to significant personal use is 
unlikely to depreciate on account of wear and tear, as the owner will 
be strongly motivated to keep the property in good condition.  
(a)   Integrate the Rental Aspect of § 280A with § 183 
 In the case of a rental of a residence, the likelihood is that the 
rental is a device to pay some of the costs of carrying property that 
was primarily acquired for personal use, or to extract some cash for 
what is basically a house-sitting function of the tenant. Under such 
 86. Not-for-profit rental or other activity in a personal residence could fall under both 
provisions. Section 280A(f)(3) appears to say that the operating rules of § 280A take prece-
dence but that non-profit years can count for purposes of the § 183 presumption. See I.R.C. 
§ 280A(f)(3). Section 280A also potentially overlaps with § 469 (dealing with losses from 
passive activities, including rental activities), and here again § 280A takes precedence. See 
id. § 469(j)(10). 
 87. Personal deductions are not disallowed, id. § 280A(b), but they reduce the amount 
that can be deducted (if at all) with respect to the use, id. § 280A(c)(5). 
 88. Id. § 280A(a). 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. § 280A(c). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. § 280A(g). 
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circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the rental is at arm’s 
length for a market-rate rental. 
 Accordingly, the rental use of a residence of the taxpayer should 
be treated as a per se not-for-profit activity, subject to the mechanical 
rules of § 183(b), including the no-carryover rule and disallowance of 
depreciation on buildings and furnishings.  
 The § 183 approach should not apply in cases where the personal 
use is insignificant or a for-profit motive is likely to exist. Possible 
scenarios deserving of an exception include: (1) rental for more than, 
say, 300 days in a year at a fair rental,93 and (2) personal use for less 
than fifteen days a year coupled with at least 185 days of rental use 
under management by a professional rental agent. 
 The existing rule that ignores both rental income and deductions 
if rental use is less than fifteen days a year94 is overly generous, as 
very high daily rentals can be obtained in desirable locations and for 
special events (such as the Olympic Games, bowl games, football 
weekends, and the Santa Fe Indian Market). In the case of de mini-
mis rental use, none of the costs of owning or maintaining the resi-
dence are truly related to the obtaining of rents, and therefore the 
rents should be included with no offsetting deductions. Rents (and 
deductions) should be ignored only if the rents are less than, say, 
$500 a year. 
(b)   Disallowance of Deductions for Costs of a Residence Used in a 
Business 
 Non-residential uses of a residence are likely undertaken out of 
personal convenience, not business necessity, and (in most cases) it 
could not be shown that the business-use space within the residence 
would not have been acquired for personal reasons. The “exclusive 
business use” test is unenforceable, as the typical home office can al-
so serve as a media room, a den, a library, an extra bedroom, and a 
place for personal computing and bill paying. However, the mechani-
cal rule of § 183(b) does not make sense here because costs allocable 
to the residence do not generate any income directly. Therefore, the 
appropriate solution in this scenario is simply to disallow not only 
depreciation but also general residence-related costs (such as utility 
costs and general house repairs). Total disallowance is consistent 
with the general tax approach to dual-purpose costs generally.95 This 
 93. Websites such as Zillow.com post estimated rental values of virtually all proper-
ties in the United States. 
 94. I.R.C. § 280A(g). 
 95. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) (commuting to work); 
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) (costs of acquiring human capital); Wrightsman v. 
United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (costs relating to personal-use property with 
high appreciation potential); Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (B.T.A. 1939) (child 
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approach would obviate the need for allocations of gross income and 
deductions to the business use of the home. 
 Here, the deduction-disallowance rule would be waived for: (1) de-
ductions not related to the residence but related to the business ac-
tivity, (2) deductions relating to in-residence non-transportable busi-
ness property and supplies not adaptable for personal use (such as 
technical equipment and chemicals), and (3) separate structures (or 
attached structures that are not adaptable to personal use, such as 
art studios) used exclusively in the taxpayer’s trade or business. Of 
course, the “business” in question could itself be a not-for-profit activ-
ity subject to § 183. 
(c)   Travel Expenses to Maintain a Residence 
 Independently of the foregoing, the Code should be amended to 
disallow travel expenses relating to property used as a personal resi-
dence by the taxpayer for more than, say, fourteen days a year. Such 
property’s location reflects the taxpayer’s desire to visit that loca-
tion, and travel expenses thereto can be assumed to be personal            
recreational expenses. 
6.   Tangible Personal Property Available for Personal Use 
 The IRS is in no position to monitor the bona fide (non-rental) 
business use of items such as computers, printers, cell phones, tab-
lets, vehicles, and other (movable) tangible property that (a) is not 
permanently located on the taxpayer’s business premises and (2) is 
available for personal use. Some of these items are currently treated 
as “listed property” subject to § 280F, but that section still allows de-
ductions for depreciation and other deductions with respect to certain 
listed property with more than 50% of personal use. 
 Given that even employers have difficulty in enforcing a business-
use-only rule for employees using employer property of this nature 
(even property located on the employer’s premises), it is wholly un-
reasonable to expect the IRS to enforce the distinction between busi-
ness and personal use where the taxpayer receives no rental income 
from the property. Accordingly, deductions with respect to these 
items should simply be disallowed, period. The Treasury should be 
authorized to issue regulations allowing exceptions for situations 
where the IRS is confident that the property is subject to no more 
than de minimis personal use. 
care to enable one to work); Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 C.B. 35 (work clothing adaptable to 
personal use). 
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7.   Credit Card Interest 
 The IRS cannot reasonably be expected to monitor a taxpayer’s 
allocation of interest on credit card debt among the various categories 
of interest. Accordingly, such interest should be wholly disallowed 
unless the card is exclusively devoted to business use. 
K.   Cancellation-of-Debt Income 
 The courts and IRS appear to be extending the concept of cancella-
tion-of-debt (COD) income to situations where the individual has no 
real increase in wealth or ability to pay.96 Reigning in the concept of 
COD income to an appropriate extent can be viewed as being in the 
nature of “clarification of doctrine,” which would advance the cause of 
taxpayer comprehension and reduce unexpected (and unpleasant) 
taxpayer involvement with the system.97 
 For purposes of this discussion, “COD income” refers to a situation 
where a debt disappears by operation of law (such as the running of 
the statute of limitations), action of the creditor, or agreement be-
tween the debtor and creditor.98 COD income should exist only where 
the taxpayer is enriched by the borrowing (or credit) transaction as a 
whole.99 The paradigm COD scenario is where the taxpayer borrows 
cash and is relieved of having to pay it back. 
 COD income should not arise in cases where a mere liability, un-
related to the taxpayer’s obtaining cash or property on credit, is can-
celled or forgiven.100 Examples are fines, penalties, tax liabilities, 
child support obligations, and charges for money, goods, or services 
never obtained by the taxpayer. In these cases, the “liability” is a 
mere prediction of a future expense or loss, and the avoidance of even 
an anticipated future decrease in wealth is not income. 
 Second, COD income should not arise on the forgiveness of pur-
chase money debt in cases where the taxpayer still owns the acquired 
property. Such a rule already exists in § 108(e)(5) for two-party pur-
 96. See Payne v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1253 (2008), aff’d, 357 F. App’x 734 
(8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 151 (2010); Hahn v. Commissioner, 93 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1055 (2007) (forgiveness of earned interest). 
 97. I.R.C. § 108(a) avoids current inclusion of COD income in certain cases, but at the 
cost of reducing such favorable tax attributes as net operating losses carryovers and basis. 
See id. § 108(b). It is doubtful that an ordinary individual taxpayer would be able to com-
prehend or comply with this approach.  
 98. The term does not refer to satisfaction of a taxpayer’s debt or liability by the tax-
payer or by a third party, debt cancellations that are means of paying for goods or services 
provided by the debtor to the creditor, or erroneous deduction accruals by accrual method 
taxpayers (or other scenarios that involve application of the tax benefit rule). 
 99. For other commentary along similar lines, see generally Richard C.E. Beck, Can-
cellation of Debt and Other Incidental Items of Income: Puritan Tax Rules in the U.S., 49 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 695 (2004). 
 100. Older cases support this view. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 
751 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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chase money debt, and it should be extended to three-party purchase 
money debt.101 In this type of case, the taxpayer never received cash 
to spend freely. Rather, the taxpayer is committing herself to pay the 
purchase price in future installments. Instead of the taxpayer having 
COD income, the basis of the property should be reduced with recap-
ture of excessive depreciation deductions. Here, the taxpayer is  
merely paying a reduced amount for the property. The typical ap-
plication of this approach would be to a renegotiation downwards of a           
residential mortgage.  
 Taking the foregoing a step further, COD income should not arise 
by reason of avoiding consumer debt, including unpaid interest or 
rental obligations. The rationale (again) is that the taxpayer is pay-
ing a reduced price for consumption and that arm’s length bargain 
purchases of consumption do not give rise to income.102 
 However, third-party credit card debt is distinguishable, because 
it essentially entails a loan of cash to the cardholder followed by an 
immediate cash payment to the merchant.103 Thus, a reduction in 
bank credit card debt is true COD income because the taxpayer has 
been enriched in tax terms. 
L.   Alimony vs. Child Support 
 Current law allows a transactional election between two tax re-
gimes concerning the payment of cash from one divorced spouse to 
another: (1) if several statutory requirements are complied with to 
constitute the payments as “tax alimony,” the payments are deducti-
ble by the payor and includible by the payee, or (2) otherwise, as the 
default rule, the payments are ignored by both payor and payee. 
These alternatives are supposed to be independent of state law. How-
ever, the requirement for tax alimony that the payments must     
terminate on the death of the payee spouse has resulted in entan-
glement with state law,104 as has the rule that a label of “child sup-
port” (possibly imposed by a court regardless of the parties’ inten-
tions) also negates characterization as tax alimony. Additionally, un-
sophisticated divorce lawyers are often ignorant of the tax rules and 
their implications. 
 101. The IRS views this scenario as giving rise to COD income. See Rev. Rul. 91-31, 
1991-1 C.B. 19. 
 102. In some cases, COD income is avoided under the disputed-debt doctrine of current 
law. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding there is no COD 
income where dispute is over value received). 
 103. Rev. Rul. 78-38, 1978-1 C.B. 68. It would be virtually impossible to allocate any 
reduction in bank credit card debt to particular purchases. 
 104. See, e.g., Preston v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000); Ribera v. 
Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1807 (1997). 
                                                                                                                  
2013]  SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS 97 
 
 The default rule should be that cash payments from one ex-spouse 
to another pursuant to an instrument of divorce or separation should 
be deductible by the payor and includible by the payee, regardless of 
state law, what the payments are called, or whether they can survive 
the payee spouse’s death.105 A deduction/inclusion scheme would ac-
cord with the ability-to-pay principle. The payor spouse is typically in 
a higher tax bracket than the payee spouse, meaning that larger 
payments (than otherwise) can be made, leaving both parties better 
off after tax. Economically, there is virtually no difference between 
cash transfers labeled as alimony or as child support, as only rarely 
is the payee spouse held to account for misuse of the funds. The pay-
ee spouse would be entitled to any available dependency exemption. 
The spouses could jointly make an election into a no-deduction/no-
inclusion rule, in which case the payor would have superior rights to 
the dependency exemption. 
 Exceptions to the deduction/inclusion scheme could lie for front-
loaded payments, payments that look like they are in lieu of a prop-
erty transfer, or payments that have the effect of a property purchase 
(which are to be disregarded under § 1041). 
M.   Small Business Tax Accounting 
 This proposal would allow certain small business taxpayers (how-
ever defined) to elect to use cash accounting for inventory and other 
items, thereby giving them the opportunity to fill out their tax re-
turns without resorting to accountants and tax return preparers. 
1.   Expand Use of the Cash Method 
 A business is currently required to use the accrual method if it (a) 
keeps its books according to financial accounting principles,106 (b) 
carries inventories,107 or (c) is required by statute to do so.108 Whatev-
er might be said for accrual accounting for purposes of financial 
statements, it is hard to see how cash accounting can misstate in-
come for tax purposes, as a general matter.109 The tax base is an an-
 105. If the payee is not the ex-spouse, the same rules should apply unless the payee is 
an exempt entity or non-U.S. taxpayer, in which case the payor would forego the deduction 
but be eligible to claim the dependency exemption. 
 106. I.R.C. § 446(a), (c)(2). 
 107. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i). 
 108. See I.R.C. §§ 447, 448. 
 109. The legislative history to § 448 lamely states that the accrual method better con-
forms to financial accounting principles (especially the “matching principle”) than the cash 
method. No abuses of the cash method are cited. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 474-75 (Comm. 
Print 1987). On the merits, it might be said that trade receivables received on the sale of 
goods and services are an “accession to wealth,” but the current income tax is a realization 
income tax, and receivables represent unrealized income. Where the receivables are highly 
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nual construct, and matching is not a tax norm.110 The cash method 
should be allowed, at the taxpayer’s option, unless a good reason ex-
ists to the contrary. 
2.   Opting Out of Inventory Accounting 
 Under present law, the purchase (or production) and sale of inven-
tories is required to follow inventory accounting, which entails treat-
ing inventory costs (when accrued) as capital expenditures and fol-
lowing a recognized convention, such as FIFO, for allocating such 
costs to the taxable year. However, some exceptions already exist to 
this approach.111 
 Although capitalization is a hard norm of income taxation, reasons 
to relax it exist in the case of small business generally. The link be-
tween any particular cost and any particular sold item is already 
severed by the existence of inventory-accounting conventions. The 
gain from inventories is not compensation for the use of money or 
property, nor is it in the nature of market appreciation. Sellers of in-
ventory have a natural incentive to sell it as promptly as is feasible. 
Essentially, inventory gains are the product of services (buying in 
one market and selling in another, plus servicing customers). Non-
capitalization is simpler than the approach of current law, and there 
appears to be little potential for tax avoidance, especially if the tax-
payer is on the cash method of accounting.112 In other words,              
it is proposed that inventory costs be generally treated as                    
business expenses. 
 The option to forego capitalization should not be available to small 
businesses that are required to capitalize inventory costs under regu-
latory law or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to 
assets that are depreciable, to inventories of investments (land and 
securities), to inventories of unique assets (art and collectibles), to 
liquid, the merchant possesses an incentive to sell the receivables. Many receivables of 
service providers will never be collected, as the sellers of services have no security. 
 110. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931); Deborah A. Geier, The 
Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 17 (1998). 
 111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3T (allowing expensing of materials and supplies), § 1.162-
6 (expensing of outlays of professionals), § 1.162-12 (farming costs). Additionally, small 
resellers of goods, farmers, and artists are not required to capitalize direct and indirect 
costs relating to inventories. See I.R.C. § 263A(b)(2)(B), (d), (h). Similarly, businesses that 
perform services on a “project” basis (such as architects and plaintiffs’ lawyers) do not capi-
talize costs to such projects. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2004) (service projects to obtain 
future fees from clients generally not treated as “intangibles”). Certain costs of extracting 
natural resources are likewise not capitalized. See id. §§ 263(c), 616, 617. 
 112. In the bad old days, expense deductions could be accrued by an accrual method 
taxpayer simply by entering into a contract for the purchase of goods to be delivered in the 
future. Under current § 461(h)(2)(A)(ii), the deduction cannot be accrued any earlier than 
the goods are provided to the taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A)(ii). 
                                                                                                                  
2013]  SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS 99 
 
taxpayers using long-term contract accounting, or to other businesses 
or items for which expensing is not appropriate (as listed in regulations). 
3.   Simplified Asset Accounting 
 Except for capital expenditures currently deducted under “expens-
ing” rules, all capital expenditures of a “small business” incurred dur-
ing the year (that relate to wasting assets) would be collected into a 
single vintage account and depreciated on a straight line basis over, 
say, four years, with all assets being deemed to have been put in ser-
vice on January 1 of the vintage year. No depreciation deduction 
would be allowed in the year of the asset’s disposal. The asset’s basis 
(for purposes of figuring gain or loss) would be its cost less 25% 
thereof for any year of depreciation. 
N.   Book-Tax Conformity for Public C Corporations 
 C corporations, as a general matter, compute taxable income in 
the same way as do individuals for purposes of the corporate income 
tax.113 However, a corporation is a tax entity separate from its share-
holders, and the corporate income tax is, at its core, an excise tax 
that takes the form of an income tax in order to accommodate mar-
ginally profitable businesses. C corporation tax accounting would be 
simplified if it conformed to GAAP rather than the tax accounting 
rules for individuals, at least if the corporation follows GAAP ac-
counting. It might be thought that individual/corporate tax account-
ing uniformity (1) eliminates tax incentives as to form of business 
entity, (2) avoids tax disparities that would exist with respect to simi-
larly-situated GAAP-reporting businesses (because GAAP involves 
principles rather than a comprehensive set of rules), and (3) avoids 
the tax-driven race to the bottom within the accounting profession 
that might occur if GAAP were followed for tax purposes. 
 I do not find these arguments to be persuasive on their face. A 
strong tax incentive already exists not to incorporate: the double 
shareholder/corporation tax.114 Additionally, corporate tax reform 
may include other features, such as lower rates and rules mandating 
the form of business organization, that could affect evaluation of how 
corporate tax accounting should work. For publicly traded C corpora-
tions, book-tax conformity would balance client demand for higher 
 113. See id. § 63(a). The gross income computation is the same for individuals and C 
corporations; some deductions are only allowed for individuals and some are only allowed 
for corporations, but most are allowed for both. See §§ 63(b), 151(a), and the captions to 
I.R.C. Subtitle A, Ch. 1, Subch. B, Parts VI, VII, and VIII (Income Taxes). 
 114. It should be noted that, if the C corporation tax rate is lower than the individual 
tax rate, and if capital gains (and dividends) are also subject to lower-than-normal individ-
ual rates, then corporate accumulations and delayed distributions can save taxes relative 
to a pass-through system. 
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earnings against the client demand for lower taxes. Book-tax con-
formity should itself create a demand for greater uniformity in the 
application of accounting standards among businesses. I conclude 
that this simplification option at least deserves serious study as a 
component of a broader package of business-entity tax reform. 
O.   Gratuitous Transfers 
 Various tax rules relating to the income taxation of gratuitous 
transfers can be simplified or eliminated. 
1.   What is a “Gift” 
 Under current law, the test for the § 102(a) exclusion for “gifts” 
and “bequests” is whether the donor’s motive is one of “ ‘disinterested 
generosity.’ ”115 A test keyed to motive of a person other than the tax-
payer is unworkable. Taxpayers are free to take aggressive positions 
on this issue without incurring a significant risk of penalties     
and/or tax fraud prosecution.116 The existing rule breeds costly fact-      
bound litigation. 
 A subjective test is unnecessary and should be replaced by the ob-
jective test adopted by the gift tax (as well as the charitable contribu-
tion deduction), namely, whether a transfer of wealth has not been 
made for full and adequate consideration in money or money’s worth, 
or in an ordinary commercial transaction.117 Additionally, any receipt 
of money or property from a business entity should not be excludible 
as a gift for income tax purposes. 
2.   Repeal § 274(b) 
 Section 274(b) disallows business deductions for certain items that 
are excluded solely as gifts. This section is badly drafted insofar as it 
assumes that certain items are excluded as gifts where really they 
are not. Additionally, this provision would be rendered moot by the 
change mentioned immediately above. Third, deductibility as a busi-
ness deduction should not hinge on the tax treatment of another par-
ty. The tests for deductibility under § 162 are independent of the    
test for exclusion under § 102(a). Accordingly, this section should            
be repealed. 
 115. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (quoting Commissioner 
v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). 
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 117. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8. 
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3.   Repeal the Basis-Disallowance Rule for Gifts of Depreciated-
Value Property 
 Section 1015 generally provides a carryover basis rule for inter 
vivos gifts, but a complex exception lies for gifts of depreciated-value 
property, under which the basis can “float” until the property is sold 
by the donee. The only conceivable purpose of this rule is to prevent 
the assignment of built-in losses from a lower-bracket donor to a 
higher-bracket donee. This scenario would appear to be uncommon, 
since lower-bracket donors rarely have unrealized-loss property to 
give away. Yet § 1015 allows the assignment of built-in gains by 
higher-bracket donors to lower-bracket donees, which is a much more 
serious problem as far as income-shifting strategems are concerned. 
Thus, the exception should be repealed. 
4.   Repeal the § 691(c) Deduction and the § 1015(d)(6) Basis Ad-
justment 
 The § 691(c) deduction is available to a person acquiring a right to 
“income in respect of a decedent” (IRD) of an amount equal to the es-
tate tax (if any) “on” the IRD right, when the IRD is included in in-
come. (IRD rights, which are rights to earned but unpaid income of a 
decedent, do not obtain a step-up in basis under § 1014.)118 The theo-
ry of the deduction is that, if the decedent had included the income 
on her final return, the estate tax base would have been reduced by 
the income tax paid or owed by the decedent. If the income and estate 
tax rates are the same, the § 691(c) deduction is equal to the hypo-
thetical estate tax savings that would have resulted from the hypo-
thetical inclusion of the IRD in the decedent’s income. 
 The § 691(c) deduction is not only complex, but it is also so obscure 
(being unrelated to any cost) as to be susceptible of being overlooked 
except by the cognoscenti. Moreover, it is based on a false assump-
tion, namely that the IRD was subject to income tax of the decedent. 
In fact, the IRD is income of the recipient of the IRD right, not the 
decedent.119 Equal treatment between estate transfers of IRD rights 
and ordinary cash is not appropriate, because the situations are not 
the same. The current rules for IRD have the effect of deferring in-
come and of attributing the income to a person who may well occupy 
a lower tax bracket than that of the decedent. The income tax paid by 
the IRD recipient will appropriately reduce the IRD recipient’s poten-
tial transfer tax base. The § 691 deduction serves no legitimate pur-
pose and should be repealed.  
 118. See I.R.C. § 1014(c). 
 119. See id. § 691(a). 
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 Section 1015(d)(6) gives a donee of appreciated property an income 
tax basis increase equal to the gift tax (if any) on the unrealized ap-
preciation in the gift property. Apparently, the adjustment is “for” a 
hypothetical income tax of the donor that would have hypothetically 
reduced the gift amount.120 If so, the rationale for § 1015(d)(6) is at 
least as flimsy as that for the § 691(c) deduction. Not only is this sce-
nario purely hypothetical, but no donor would realize gain that would 
otherwise be wiped out by the stepped-up basis rule of § 1014. 
5.   Grantor Trusts 
 The rules as to what trusts are deemed to be owned by the grantor 
are forbiddingly complex.121 Proposals range from treating all inter 
vivos trusts as grantor trusts to that of treating no such trusts as 
grantor trusts.122 Here I’ll offer an intermediate proposal: a grantor 
trust would be a disregarded entity123 if income or corpus could be (or 
is required to be) distributed to the grantor or the grantor’s spouse.124 
The identity and status of the person holding such power would be 
irrelevant,125 and limitations (standards) on any such distributive 
power would be disregarded. 
 Because of the fact that a grantor trust is a disregarded entity for 
income attribution purposes, a grantor trust should not be treated as 
a separate taxpayer for any other income tax purpose.126 It follows 
that transactions between a grantor and a grantor trust would be 
 120. The gift tax on the unrealized appreciation is not an acquisition cost of the donee, 
because the donor is liable for the gift tax. Id. § 2502(c). Even so, acquisition costs are not 
added to the § 1015 basis, but subsumed within it. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4 (basis to the 
donee is the greater of the § 1015 basis or any cost of acquiring the gift). 
 121. See I.R.C. §§ 671-677. Section 678, treating certain trusts as owned by a benefi-
ciary, would also be repealed. 
 122. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, The Grantor Trust Rules Should be Repealed, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 885 (2011). Grantor trusts can be used to avoid the highly compressed rate schedule 
of § 1(e) applicable to trust and estate net income, but trusts can still be used to shift in-
come from the grantor’s higher marginal rates to the lower marginal rates of distributees. 
It should be noted that the “kiddie tax,” see I.R.C. § 1(g), curbs the use of trusts to shift 
income to minors, but this renders § 677(b) (trust income used to discharge grantor’s sup-
port obligation) largely pointless. 
 123. The grantor continues to be taxed on the trust’s income, because the grantor is 
deemed to be the owner of the trust property. I.R.C. § 671. 
 124. Sections 674 and 675 (the most technical of the grantor trust rules) would be re-
pealed, and §§ 673, 676, and 677(a) would be combined. Professor Ascher concedes that 
§ 676 (power to re-vest corpus in grantor or grantor’s spouse) should be retained. Ascher, 
supra note 122, at 930. Section 677(a) extends the principle expressed in § 676 to income. 
Section 673 (retained reversions worth more than 5%) should be retained because non-
trust retained-reversion transfers are ineffective to shift income. 
 125. The concept of “adverse party”—an artificial construct—would cease to play a role 
in this area. 
 126. Cf. Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing an in-
stallment sale from a grantor trust to a grantor), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. 
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disregarded. The model for such a rule is § 1041, dealing with proper-
ty transfers between husband and wife.127 
6.   A “Simple Estate” Income Tax Regime 
 Under current law, estates are taxed as Subchapter J trusts,128 
but special rules come into play only for estates.129 The system is 
complex, and its rules are often skipped over in the basic income tax 
and estate and gift tax courses, so that estate attorneys may be insuf-
ficiently aware of them, with the resulting incurrence of unnecessary 
taxes.130 There is no policy reason to tax estate net income at the 
highest marginal rate (as can easily occur under present law), as es-
tates (which result from a transferor’s death) are not illegitimate in-
come shifting devices. 
 A simpler income tax regime should be available for any estate 
that (1) possesses a net value under a certain amount (perhaps $2 
million), (2) does not provide for a successive interest transfer (in 
trust or otherwise), and (3) is not a trust in disguise (i.e., is wound up 
within a reasonable time after the decedent’s death). 
 Specific-bequest property, and the income therefrom, would be 
deemed to be owned by the legatee (and not the estate) for income 
attribution purposes starting on the day following the decedent’s 
death. All other estate income and deductions would be aggregated at 
the entity level and attributed to the residual legatees (and/or heirs) 
in proportion to their interests. (No estate net income would be allo-
cated to fixed-sum legatees.131) The estate would pay a withholding 
tax at the highest individual marginal rate on all estate net income, 
including net capital gains. (The withholding tax would be charged 
pro rata against the estate distributions to residual legatees or heirs.) 
These estate beneficiaries would, in addition to reporting their rata-
ble share of estate net income, obtain a tax credit for their share of 
 127. Section 1041 treats a “sale” between marital partners as a non-realization event, 
and the transferor’s basis carries over to the transferee. I.R.C. § 1041(a), (b). 
 128. See id. § 641(a). 
 129. See id. §§ 642(b)(1), 663(a)(1). 
 130. Under current law, if the estate net income is greater than distributions to residu-
ary legatees (and heirs), the excess is taxed to the trust under the highly compressed rate 
schedule of I.R.C. § 1(e). 
 131. A “specific property” bequest is one where the legatee is to receive specifically 
identified property under the will. A “fixed-sum” (or “pecuniary”) bequest is of a fixed-
dollar amount under a will. See Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b). Under the law of estates, fixed-
sum legatees (unlike other legatees and heirs) are not entitled to a share of estate income, 
but they may be entitled to interest payments. See RICHARD B. COVEY, MARITAL DEDUC-
TION AND CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS, App. B 
(4th ed. 1997) (compilation of state rules on this issue). Any interest payable by the estate 
on account of a delayed distribution of a fixed-sum bequest would be deductible to the es-
tate in arriving at estate net income for income tax purposes and would be gross income to 
the fixed-sum legatee. 
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the withholding tax.132 The executor would file an information return 
to the IRS and the estate distributees stating the gross income 
amounts and the tax credit amounts for each residual beneficiary    
or heir. 
7.   Repeal the rule that the in-kind satisfaction of a fixed-sum be-
quest is a deemed sale of the property 
 Under current law, the satisfaction of a fixed-sum bequest with in-
kind property is treated as a sale by the estate (or trust) of the asset 
to the legatee at its fair market value,133 but other estate distribu-
tions entail a different set of income tax consequences.134 These rules 
add unneeded complexity to the system and may be overlooked by 
fiduciaries. The rule as to fixed-sum bequests is conceptually mis-
guided, because the distributee has not given any consideration in 
money or money’s worth for the right to the bequest. Whatever pur-
pose might be served under probate law for treating the pecuniary 
obligation as a “debt”135 has no relevance for income tax purposes.136 
 Accordingly, all in-kind distributions should be treated alike: the 
distribution would not constitute a realization event, and the estate’s 
basis would carry over to the distributee.137 
P.   Transactional Accounting Issues 
1.   Basis of In-Kind Income Items 
 Under current law, some confusion exists as to whether the “tax 
cost” basis of in-kind property receipts should be the amount actually 
included in gross income or, instead, the amount includible (although 
not in fact included). Often this issue is dealt with by applying the 
complex “mitigation provisions”138 or fact-intensive equitable doc-
trines, such as equitable estoppel, equitable recoupment, or the duty 
of consistency.139 Resort to these provisions and doctrines assumes 
 132. The suggested system would do away with the distribution deduction and the 
computation of estate distributable net income. See I.R.C. §§ 643(a), 661, 662. Net tax ex-
empt income would also be passed through. 
 133. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 
C.B. 194; see also I.R.C. § 267(a)(1), (b)(13) (allowance of loss to estate in this scenario). 
 134. See I.R.C. § 643(e) (default rule is that distribution is not a realization event). 
 135. Treating pecuniary bequests as “debts” is what results in the estate’s obligation to 
pay interest if the distribution of the bequest is unreasonably delayed. See supra note 131. 
 136. The proposed change is in line with that for “false” COD income, involving the 
forgiveness of debts not incurred for value received. See supra text accompanying notes 
100-01. 
 137. Section 643(e) would be modified to accord with this proposal. If the distribution 
deduction/inclusion system of present §§ 661 and 662 continues in force for trusts (and 
large estates), the distribution would be “at” the trust’s basis. 
 138. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314. 
 139. The various doctrinal strands in this area are discussed in JOSEPH M. DODGE ET 
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that the statute of limitations applies to basis determinations, a posi-
tion that is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobson v. 
Commissioner,140 as well as the position of all courts of appeals in 
cases involving recoveries of amounts erroneously deducted in prior 
years.141 Since basis is not subject to the statute of limitations, link-
ing basis to what the taxpayer actually reported does not involve the 
re-opening of barred issues. As a policy matter, taxpayers should not 
obtain collateral tax benefits for their own errors and omissions. 
 Accordingly, the “tax cost” basis of any in-kind property receipt (or 
of any claim to a right to recovery of an item previously expended) 
should depend on the taxpayer’s actual prior tax treatment of the item. 
2.   Repeal § 1341 
 Section 1341 gives a taxpayer that refunds or repays a previously 
included item the choice between the deduction that would be al-
lowed as a matter of course and a credit equal to the incremental 
taxes “caused” by the prior income inclusion of the refunded amount. 
This provision has bred a good deal of litigation concerning its impre-
cisely worded prerequisites. If applicable, § 1341 involves recalculat-
ing the tax for a year possibly closed by the statute of limitations. 
Section 1341 was enacted in 1954 in the wake of a Supreme Court 
case where the original inclusion was subject to very high marginal 
rates in 1944 that had decreased by the year of repayment.142 The 
correct tax treatment in theory is to allow a deduction (as a matter of 
right) in the year of repayment, because the taxpayer has had the use 
of the money until then. Accordingly, § 1341 should be repealed. 
 Section 67(b)(9) provides that the deduction “allowed by” § 1341 is 
not a “miscellaneous itemized deduction.”143 However, § 1341 does not 
allow any deduction whatsoever.144 Presumably, the intent here was 
to list the deduction referred to in § 1341, but it appears (on account 
of the reference to “claim of right”) that this reference applies only 
where the § 1341 requirements for electing into the credit are satis-
fied. This technical glitch becomes moot if, as suggested above, § 67 is 
amended to cover only enumerated borderline expense deductions 
AL., supra note 73, at 654-60. 
 140. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
 141. Federal appeals courts that have considered the issue have uniformly held that 
recoveries of erroneously deducted amounts are fully includible. See, e.g., Hughes & Luce, 
L.L.P. v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 16 (5th Cir. 1995). In other words, a taxpayer’s basis in 
the right of recovery hinges on the actual prior tax treatment, not the correct prior tax 
treatment. 
 142. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A294-
95 (2d Sess. 1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4436. 
 143. I.R.C. § 67(b)(9). 
 144. See id. § 1341. Curiously, the deduction for the refund or repayment is viewed as a 
deductible “loss” under § 165(c)(2), rather than an “expense.” 
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and the distinction between above-the-line and itemized deductions 
is eliminated. Otherwise, given that the “claim of right” notion has 
been abandoned in the doctrinal substratum,145 § 67(b)(9) should be 
amended to refer to “the deduction arising from the repayment or 
refund of a previously included amount.” 
Q.   Portfolio Accounting for Publicly Traded Securities 
 Even with brokers being required to supply basis information for 
securities transactions,146 accounting for basis on an item-by-item 
basis is onerous.147 Consideration should be given to allowing taxpay-
ers to use an average basis in a portfolio of publicly traded securities. 
An average-basis approach is conceptually correct for shares of a giv-
en stock, since all such shares are fungible. The proposed system 
would simply extend this concept to the taxpayer’s entire portfolio of 
publicly traded securities, for which a year-end valuation of the port-
folio would be required. 
1.   Mechanics 
 The system would operate somewhat like inventory accounting, 
but without a physical “closing inventory.” Thus, “portfolio security 
gains” for a year would be “receipts from security dispositions” less 
“cost of securities sold.” The cost-of-securities-sold amount would be 
“cost of opening securities inventory” plus “cost of new securities in-
ventory”148 (equaling total portfolio basis) multiplied by a fraction, 
the numerator of which is “gross receipts from securities dispositions” 
and the denominator of which is the sum of (1) such gross receipts 
and (2) the sum of the market quotes for all securities on hand at the 
end of the year.149 Conceptually, this formula produces a basis offset 
(against sales receipts) equal to that percentage of the aggregate 
year-end securities basis that reflects the decrease in value of the 
portfolio caused by the sales. The “opening inventory” for the next 
year would be “cost of opening securities inventory” plus “cost of new 
securities inventory,” less “cost of securities sold,” all for the prior 
 145. See United States v. James, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (overruling Commissioner v. Wil-
cox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), a case that had held that embezzled cash was not gross income 
because not obtained under a claim of right). 
 146. See I.R.C. § 6045(g). 
 147. Under current law, where shares of the same stock are purchased at different 
times, the taxpayer has to either identify the particular securities sold or else use the first-
in, first-out convention. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c)(1). Since shares of the same stock are 
fungible, an average-basis approach is conceptually preferable to either of the methods 
sanctioned by the regulations. An average-basis approach is currently allowed only for 
certain mutual fund shares. See id. § 1.1012-1(e)(1). 
 148. “Cost of new securities inventory” would include any current-year basis adjust-
ments attributable to tax-free exchanges, gifts, bequests, OID accruals, and so on. 
 149. Thus, if there is no closing inventory of securities, the basis would be 100% (gross 
receipts/gross receipts) of the aggregate basis. 
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year. Securities that have become worthless during the year would 
not produce transactional losses. Instead, worthlessness would    
have the effect of increasing aggregate basis relative to aggregate         
portfolio value. 
 The existing distinction between long-term gains and losses and 
short-term gains and losses would, if retained, complicate the system, 
because separate pools of short-term and long-term publicly traded 
securities would need to be kept, with securities passing from a 
short-term pool to a long-term pool. The problem can be managed if 
securities are deemed to move from a short-term pool to a long-term 
pool only on January 1 of the taxable year that is the second taxable 
year following the year of purchase. Thus, securities purchased at 
any time in 2013 would reside in a short-term pool in 2013 and 
2014,150 and any remaining security cost in this pool would shift to 
the long-term pool in 2015. It would still be necessary to match sales 
receipts to the correct vintage pool. This problem would disappear if 
the distinction between long-term and short-term were to be abolished. 
2.   No Disallowance of Portfolio Net Loss 
 If the taxpayer elects to use this system, all publicly traded securi-
ties would be required to be accounted for within it. In that case, the 
system would operate in a manner that would preclude the cherry 
picking of losses, because the proceeds from the sale of any security 
would trigger the same basis recovery amount, regardless of whether 
that particular security had appreciated or depreciated. Sales would 
produce losses only where the portfolio as a whole (inclusive of the 
year’s transactions) is in a loss position. 
 Since the cherry picking of losses would not be a major concern 
under the portfolio approach, consideration could be given to allowing 
any portfolio loss for the year as a current deduction, without any 
carry forward of losses (except for negative taxable income caused by 
such losses). If losses were allowed in full, the losses should carry 
symmetrical tax treatment to any favorable tax treatment conferred 
upon portfolio gain. Thus, if 30% of portfolio gain were excluded by 
reason of being long-term capital gain, then 30% of portfolio losses 
would be disallowed. 
 150. Securities purchased in 2013 would reside in a “vintage 2013” pool, and sales of 
2013 securities would be offset by the average basis of sold 2013 securities. The 2013 pool 
would continue for the year 2014, and any remaining basis at the end of 2014 would pass 
into the long-term pool on January 1, 2015. Another pool, for securities purchased in 2014, 
would continue through 2015, and pass to the long-term pool in 2016. 
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3.   Partial Repeal of § 1014 
 Transitioning to the next part concerning simplification aspects of 
certain tax reform measures, it is fair to say that academic tax com-
mentators are unanimous in their condemnation of the rule that 
death wipes out unrealized asset gains and losses.151 Repeal of this 
rule would also generate substantial revenue. 
 The portfolio-basis system described above could, if mandatory, be 
used as a vehicle for partial repeal of § 1014 (really, of the rule that 
death is not a realization event for tax purposes). The usual objection 
to such a repeal, i.e., that historic basis is too hard to ascertain, 
would carry no weight, as portfolio basis would have been adjusted 
annually. The net portfolio gain or loss would be deemed realized in 
the year of the taxpayer’s death. The fair market value of the portfo-
lio assets at the decedent’s death would fix both the amount realized 
by the decedent at death and the basis of the decedent’s successors in 
such assets. 
IV.   TAX REFORMS CONTRIBUTING TO SIMPLIFICATION 
 This Part deals with tax reform options that also offer simplifica-
tion potential. Since this Article is not being used as a vehicle for 
pushing my personal tax reform agenda, the emphasis herein is on 
the simplification potential offered by what might be called the “usu-
al suspects” in the vast array of possible tax reform proposals. 
A.   Tax Expenditures 
 It might be obvious that the place to start is with wholesale elimi-
nation of those numerous Code provisions that can be called “tax ex-
penditures,” in the narrow sense of having been enacted to serve a 
programmatic goal, such as investment in a certain type of business, 
the creation of domestic jobs, or the subsidization of child care. (The 
broader issue of defining a tax expenditure as any deviation from 
some tax-base norm—such as Haig-Simons income—would not serve 
the purposes of the present discussion, which is not focused on 
norms.152) All such programmatic tax expenditures must contain 
qualification rules that distinguish the favored activity from non-
favored activity. These qualification rules are typically detailed and 
 151. See Joseph M. Dodge, Why a Deemed-Realization Rule for Gratuitous Transfers Is 
Superior to Carryover Basis and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Present Estate and Gift 
Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 421 (2001), and authorities cited therein. 
 152. For example, from a consumption tax perspective, capital expenditures should be 
expensed; from an accretion income tax perspective, capital expenditures should not be 
expensed, and depreciation should equal the annual decline in an asset’s value; from a 
realization income tax perspective, it is questionable whether depreciation should be al-
lowed at all. 
                                                                                                                  
2013]  SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS 109 
 
complex.153 But, although their wholesale elimination from the tax 
Code would advance the cause of tax simplicity, the same programs, 
now “off tax,” would entail non-tax complexity and attendant compli-
ance costs. Abolishing the programs altogether might advance the 
cause of “government program simplicity,” but simplicity at that level 
has to be weighed in the larger context of policy, which is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Of course, where these “programs” are not      
justified in policy terms, repealing them would advance the cause            
of simplification. 
 In the name of transparency, I would only suggest that program-
matic tax expenditures take the form of tax credits rather than de-
ductions. Since some of the deduction provisions that are generally 
thought of as tax expenditures (such as accelerated depreciation154 
and expensing of research and experimentation outlays155) occupy a 
gray zone of accounting uncertainty, these provisions might even be 
justified in the name of simplification. However, simplification in this 
context only argues that rules are preferable to case-by-case deter-
minations. Simplification alone does not justify one set of rules     
over another. 
B.   Capital Gains 
 The arguments for and against special rates for capital gains are 
well rehearsed and will not be repeated here.156 Without doubt, vast 
simplification of the income tax can be obtained by eliminating (to 
the extent possible) the apparatus regarding capital gains. Some of 
this apparatus, however, might be needed to cope with the problem of 
cherry picking capital losses, which (although tangentially considered 
above in connection with investment portfolio accounting) is system-
atically addressed here. 
1.   Plan A: Eliminate Special Rates for Net Capital Gain 
 Section 1(h), providing special (low) rates for various categories of 
net capital gains, is so complex that its details probably cannot be 
grasped by even a very intelligent tax expert, so that a lengthy work-
sheet (or computer program) is required. Additionally, Schedule D of 
the Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) requires the entry of 
extensive data broken down into numerous categories. 
 An obvious option is to provide no tax benefit for net capital gains 
in any form. 
 153. See, e.g., I.R.C. 179(d). 
 154. Id. §§ 168(b)(1), (k), 179. 
 155. Id. § 174. 
 156. See generally TAX ANALYSTS, THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY (J. Andrew Ho-
erner ed., 1992). 
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2.   Plan B: Simplify the Benefits Conferred on Net Capital Gain 
 A secondary option is to replace the present “rate” approach by a 
“partial exclusion” approach for net capital gains. For example, some 
percentage of net capital gains, say, 30%, would be excluded from 
gross income. The existing approach essentially eliminates any pro-
gressivity in the capital gains system at the upper end of the income 
scale (where virtually all net capital gains are concentrated) and 
therefore disproportionately favors taxpayers in the very highest rate 
bracket.157 The exclusion approach also better accords with an “infla-
tion adjustment” rationale for favorable treatment. Finally, the ex-
clusion approach is compatible with the structure of the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT), because the exclusion can (and should) be add-
ed back in computing AMT taxable income. 
3.   Eliminate the Category of “Collectibles” Gain 
 Net collectibles gain is currently subject to a maximum tax rate of 
28%.158 Either net collectibles gain deserves treatment on a par with 
other investments in the capital gains system or it does not. In my 
view it does not, since collectibles are usually held for personal use or 
could be held for personal use without the knowledge of the IRS. 
Hence, it can be presumed that the acquisition and disposition of col-
lectibles is driven more by personal taste than economic considera-
tions. Indeed, losses on such assets are (usually) subject to disallow-
ance as personal losses, and the activity of collecting is likely to be 
held to be a not-for-profit activity.159 
 If any collectibles are to obtain a full capital gains benefit, strict 
“investment” requirements should be imposed. For example, the col-
lectible should have been purchased for a substantial sum (say, 
$40,000, or perhaps more) and should be required to be stored in a 
vault or warehouse and barred from any personal use. 
4.   Full Depreciation Recapture for Real Estate 
 The argument against recapture (as ordinary gain) of gain caused 
by depreciation of real estate is not convincing.160 The argument is 
 157. To illustrate this point, assume that taxpayers X and Y are in the 25% and 40% 
marginal rate brackets, respectively, without regard to capital gains, and that each has net 
capital gains of $10,000. Under the rate approach of current law, both X and Y pay incre-
mental tax of $1500 on this $10,000. Under a system in which 40% of net capital gains are 
excluded, X and Y would have incremental income of $6000. X, taxed at a 25% rate, would 
have the same $1500 incremental tax as before. However, Y would have an incremental tax 
of $2400. 
 158. I.R.C. § 1(h)(4)-(5). Actually, matters are more complicated than that, but the 
complications are not germane to the discussion. 
 159. See, e.g., Barcus v. Commissioner, 1973 T.C.M. (P-H) 1973-138, at 643 (1973), 
aff’d, 492 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 
 160. Existing § 1250 recaptures only the excess of accelerated over straight-line depre-
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that real estate can appreciate and depreciate at the same time, so 
that the gain might result from true unrealized appreciation deserv-
ing of capital gain treatment. However, the argument is based on the 
derivation of depreciation from a mathematical model (changes in 
present values of future yields that are fixed ab initio) that inevitably 
shows “losses” with the passage of time. The mathematical model is 
only a proxy for expected mark-to-market depreciation.161 If the asset 
did not in fact depreciate in value, then the asset was not a wasting 
asset in the taxpayer’s hands over the period it was held, and depre-
ciation should not have been allowed in the first place. Appreciation 
is an “inconsistent event” relative to the depreciation deductions.162 
Only one asset exists, and any gain should be attributed first to de-
preciation (a certain tax fact), which, by causing the basis to be re-
duced, directly produces gain. Gain that is clearly “caused” by ordi-
nary deductions (that reduce basis) should always be ordinary gain. 
Recapture already exists under § 1245 as to equivalent gain on     
personal property. The less-favorable capital gains tax rate for           
“unrecaptured § 1250 gain”163 already amounts to a partial move in              
this direction. 
 Accordingly, § 1250 should be repealed, and § 1245 should be ex-
panded to encompass all gain attributable to depreciation (and ex-
pensing). This simplification move can also be made without any oth-
er change in the capital gains system. 
 Elimination of the categories of “collectibles gain” and “unrecap-
tured § 1250 gain” would greatly facilitate a move back to a partial-
exclusion system. 
5.   Repeal § 1231 
 Section 1231 is a complicated provision, the main feature of which 
provides that net unrecaptured long-term gain from property used in 
a trade or business is net capital gain (but that net loss is ordinary 
loss). Expansion of depreciation recapture to real estate would great-
ly reduce the impact of this provision, so that it would only affect 
land and other nondepreciable property used in a business. In gen-
eral, business-use property should generate ordinary gain (and loss), 
as is the case with other business income (and loss). 
ciation, but exceptions exist. Accelerated depreciation has not been allowed on real estate 
since 1986. Thus, virtually all gain on depreciable real property is treated as capital gain or 
§ 1231 gain. 
 161. This much is evident from what many consider to be the seminal work on depreci-
ation: Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant 
Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604 (1964). 
 162. In the absence of Congressional preemption of depreciation rules, the inconsistent-
events doctrine would probably result in ordinary gain to the extent of depreciation. See 
Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
 163. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(6). 
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 Another aspect of § 1231 is to provide that net unrecaptured in-
voluntary-conversion gains on business and investment property can, 
when combined with other § 1231 gains and losses, end up as net 
capital gains despite the absence of a sale or exchange.164 There is no 
reason that unrecaptured gains should be treated as capital gains 
just because the property is disposed of in an involuntary conversion, 
because the taxpayer in such cases can avoid the recognition of in-
voluntary-conversion gain under § 1033 by reinvesting the proceeds 
of conversion in similar-use property. Unreinvested gains of an indi-
vidual are available for consumption. Finally, if the purpose of capi-
tal gains benefits is to unlock investments, then involuntary conver-
sions are not an inappropriate occasion to confer capital gains treat-
ment, because the disposition was beyond the taxpayer’s control.165 In 
general, the appropriate remedy for unexpected income or gains is a 
tax deferral rule, which already exists in the form of § 1033. Thus, 
this aspect of § 1231 also merits repeal. 
 A provision parallel to § 1231 (as far as the “character” of gain or 
loss is concerned) exists under § 165(h)(2)(B) with regard to involun-
tary conversions of personal-use assets. The same arguments for re-
peal as noted above apply here as well. (Other aspects of personal 
casualty losses and gains will be discussed below.) 
 What remains of § 1231 after repealing the foregoing is a tax ex-
penditure provision that taxes income from certain extractive and 
agricultural enterprises at lower rates.166 
C.   Losses on Sales and Exchanges 
 Even if lower rates for net capital gains are eliminated, the prob-
lem of capital losses would remain. Under current law, a taxpayer’s 
aggregate capital losses for the year can only be deducted to the ex-
tent of the sum of (1) taxpayer aggregate capital gains for the year, or 
(2) $3000 (in the case of non-corporate taxpayers).167 
1.   Restrictions on the Current Deductibility of Net Transactional 
Losses 
 The restrictions on the current deductibility of net capital losses 
are designed to prevent the cherry picking of investment losses while 
allowing gains to go unrealized. The theoretically proper anti-cherry-
picking rule would be to allow realized losses to be allowed to the ex-
 164. Id. § 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii), (a)(4)(B), (a)(4)(C). 
 165. This point was the basis for the decision in Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 
348 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 166. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(2)-(4). 
 167. Id. § 1211. Capital losses that are disallowed are carried over to future years un-
der § 1212. 
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tent of realized gains plus an amount equal to the excess (if any) of 
net realized losses over unrealized gains.168 However, accounting for 
unrealized gains would entail a valuation of appreciated assets at  
the end of the year,169 and the income tax avoids valuations as a         
general rule.  
 The “portfolio method” of accounting for securities transactions  
set forth in Part III.Q above is one way to deal with the problem.      
A less radical approach would be to allow taxpayers to elect to treat 
unrealized gains on publicly traded investments as having been real-
ized (at the end of the taxable year) to the extent of such realized net 
losses, and such gains (although not actually resulting from a sale) 
would absorb the realized net losses. Realized losses on publicly trad-
ed investments in excess of realized and deemed-realized gains would 
be allowed to the extent that such excess exceeds gains that            
are neither realized nor deemed realized. Since the assets in the 
deemed-realized-gain category are still owned by the taxpayer, an 
amount equal to the deemed-realized gain would be added to basis, 
bringing the basis of such assets up to their fair market values at  
the end of the year, effectively reducing future gains (as would occur 
with carryovers).170 
2.   Simplifying the Rules Defining Gains and Losses Subject to the 
Anti-Cherry-Picking Rule 
 If lower rates for capital gains are eliminated, the existing termi-
nology and definitions of capital gains and losses could be scrapped 
and a new system put in place that is designed solely to implement 
the anti-cherry-picking rules in an appropriate fashion. The anti-
cherry-picking rule should be limited, roughly speaking, to “volun-
tary” realized losses from investments and from those business assets 
that are not routinely disposed of at the end of a normal business cy-
cle (such as land and assets having an indefinite or very long useful 
 168. Thus, if realized losses are $10,000, realized gains are $2000, and unrealized gains 
are $5000, the amount currently deductible should be limited to $5000: $2000 + [($10,000 - 
$2000) - $5000]. Stated differently, the deduction for net realized losses would be reduced 
by the amount of unrealized (“unpicked”) gains. 
 169. Since all figures in the formula are determined as of the end of the year, a loss 
that was not truly “cherry-picked” at the time realized could be disallowed and carried over 
because of appreciation that occurred later in the year. Of course, the reverse could happen 
as well. 
 170. Again, assume that a taxpayer has realized losses of $10,000 during the year, has 
realized gains of $2000 during the year, and has unrealized gains at the end of the year of 
$5000, all involving publicly traded investments. The taxpayer would report $2000 of real-
ized gains and could elect to report an additional $5000 of deemed-realized gains (excess of 
end-of-year fair market value of appreciated assets over their then adjusted basis). In that 
case, all $10,000 of the realized losses would be allowable, because no cherry picking would 
exist in this scenario. Additionally, $5000 would be added to the basis of the unrealized 
gain assets, bringing the basis of each such asset up to the fair market value at the end of 
the year. 
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life). Thus, inventory and business equipment would normally be ex-
cluded from the loss-limitation system, as would be involuntary-
event losses, losses that were realized by reason of another party’s 
action, losses incurred by the lapse of a time period, and losses occa-
sioned by worthlessness. Various “deemed sale or exchange” rules, 
such as §§ 165(g), 166(d)(1)(B), and 1271(a)(1), could be consolidated 
into one Code section treating certain losses as falling without the 
anti-cherry-picking rule. At the same time, all transactional gains 
(not from inventory, business equipment, receivables, etc.), whether 
voluntary or not, should be allowed to offset losses subject to the anti-
cherry-picking rule. 
 The existing distinction between short-term and long-term would 
be meaningless under the anti-cherry-picking rule. If no favorable 
treatment for net capital gains is available, the holding period con-
cept could be dropped entirely. 
D.   The Personal Deductions 
 Proposals abound to eliminate, cut back, or restrict all or some of 
the personal deductions, sometimes in the name of raising revenue,171 
and sometimes in the name of conforming to a normative tax base.172 
The deductions (in various degrees) have already been seriously 
eroded by floors, ceilings, phase-out rules, and indirect disallowance 
or deferral under the Alternative Minimum Tax. These backhanded 
approaches were critiqued in Part III as contributing to complexity and 
lack of transparency. Here, the focus is on the deductions themselves. 
1.   Residential Mortgage Interest 
 Although defended by politicians as essential to preserving middle 
class homeownership, this deduction for qualified residence inter-
est173 is criticized by a broad spectrum of tax academics.174 Plausible 
proposals include: (1) eliminating the deduction entirely, (2) eliminat-
ing the deduction for interest on home equity debt (as opposed to ac-
quisition or improvement debt),175 (3) restricting the deduction to in-
 171. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, The Role of Tax Reform in Deficit Reduction, 133 
TAX NOTES 1105, 1106-07 (2011). 
 172. Numerous articles discuss the issue of whether any of the personal deductions 
conform to the concept of Haig-Simons income. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal 
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Mark G. Kelman, Person-
al Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit 
Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979); William J. Turnier, Evaluat-
ing Personal Deductions in an Income Tax—The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262, 270-76 
(1981). 
 173. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). 
 174. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique 
of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2010, at 233. 
 175. Interest on home equity debt (as opposed to acquisition debt) is allowed on up to 
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terest on (acquisition) debt for the taxpayer’s principal residence on-
ly,176 and (4) reducing the dollar figures for deduction-generating 
mortgage principal. The invocation of middle-class values is not a 
plausible defense of the deduction insofar as it relates to home equity 
debt and mortgages on second (vacation) homes. 
 This deduction is neither particularly complex nor hard to admin-
ister. Nevertheless, if a deduction for home equity indebtedness is 
retained, the “net equity” limitation found in § 163(h)(c)(1) should be 
removed, because it entails annual valuations of the property and 
annual determinations of acquisition-debt principal.177 Alternatively, 
this net equity rule could be retained but only applied as of the date 
of borrowing. A third possibility would be to require that the home 
equity loan come from an unrelated commercial lender. 
 Since the personal exemptions already include an allowance for 
housing costs, consideration should be given to imposing a floor un-
der the residential interest deduction (if it is retained) in order to 
prevent redundant deduction of the same costs. Since persons tend to 
spend at least 30% of their income on housing costs,178 and since 
mortgage interest would often be the largest such cost for homeown-
ers, a plausible floor would be $6000 (one-third of the low-income al-
lowance for a family of two as suggested earlier).179 However, such a 
floor—although perhaps a revenue raiser—would not eliminate much 
data from the system. 
2.   State and Local Taxes   
 The deduction for nonfederal taxes (unrelated to business or in-
vestment) is also controversial. Plausible proposals include (1) abol-
ishing the deduction entirely, (2) eliminating the deduction for prop-
erty taxes (or possibly only foreign property taxes), and (3) eliminat-
ing the deduction for sales taxes. 
 Accounting for state and local sales taxes is impractical. Addition-
ally, sales taxes are naturally viewed (rightly or wrongly) as a cost of 
whatever is purchased. The case for eliminating the deduction for 
$100,000 of home equity debt principal. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). 
 176. The deduction is available for interest on the taxpayer’s personal residence and 
one other residence. Id. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i). 
 177. Id. § 163(h)(c)(1). 
 178. See Mary Schwartz & Ellen Wilson, Who Can Afford to Live in a Home?: A Look at 
Data from the 2006 American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/housing/census/publications/who-can-afford.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014). 
 179. Off-the-bottom allowances are discussed in the text supra Part III.E–F. However, 
a fixed-dollar floor is probably a political non-starter, since it appears to favor high-income 
taxpayers whose mortgage interest expense would exceed the floor. The conventional ap-
proach in response to this problem is to express floors as a percentage of net income. How-
ever, that kind of floor appears to be out of synch with fixed-dollar subsistence deductions. 
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sales taxes on personal-consumption items is compelling from both a 
theoretical and practical perspective. In sum, sales taxes should be 
treated as part of the cost of whatever is purchased and not as a  
separate expense. 
 Property taxes are viewed as a cost of maintaining property, and 
costs of maintaining personal-use property should not be deducted. 
Moreover, property taxes on personal-use property can be avoided by 
renting rather than owning. Hence, it cannot be persuasively argued 
that these expenses are involuntary or are forced. Thus, the deduc-
tion for taxes on personal-use property is also a good candidate for 
repeal. Certainly, real property taxes on second homes should be dis-
allowed as being highly discretionary. Since it is sometimes hard to 
tell whether a tax on tangible personal-use personal property is real-
ly a tax, and since such taxes typically are small in amount, the de-
duction for such taxes should also be eliminated. 
 State and local income taxes cannot be avoided except by the ex-
treme measures of moving or cheating. Hence, a plausible case exists 
for deducting only these taxes. Moreover, since state and local income 
taxes are not universal in the United States, a deduction only for this 
category of nonfederal taxes is not a proper scenario for a floor under 
the deduction. 
 Taxes on real property are universal, all but five states impose 
sales taxes,180 and all but seven (or nine) states impose income taxes.181 
Aggregate state and local taxes as a percentage of income ranged (in 
2010) from about 7.0% to 12.8%,182 which is a fairly narrow spread. 
Since the tax base is supposed to be a “difference principle,” costs 
that all persons bear equally (or proportionately to income) can well 
be ignored. Although a floor under a deduction is usually appropriate 
to weed out commonly incurred expenses of a certain type, allowing a 
deduction in excess of a floor is indicated only where extraordinary 
expenses of the category in question is possible. In the case of state 
and local taxes, it is hard to see how such extraordinary payments 
can occur. Therefore, even if it is thought that one or more of the cat-
egories of state and local taxes should be deducted under a normative 
 180. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do not have compre-
hensive state sales taxes, but most have taxes that are partial substitutes for sales taxes. 
State Sales Tax Rates, SALES TAX INST., http://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/rates 
(last updated Nov. 1, 2013). 
 181. States without income taxes are Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. States Without a State Income Tax, 
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/uac/States-Without-a-State-Income-Tax (last updated Apr. 11, 
2013). Nevertheless, New Hampshire and Tennessee tax dividends and interest. See Taxes 
by State, RET. LIVING INFO. CTR., https://www.retirementliving.com/taxes-by-state (last 
updated Jan. 2013). 
 182. State and Local Tax Burdens: All States, One Year, 1977 – 2010, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 
23, 2012), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-tax-burdens-all-states-one-year-
1977-2010. 
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theory of income, a case can be made that none of them should be de-
ductible in practice. 
 Under current law, refunds of deductible taxes must be run 
through the machinery of § 111 in order to determine the portion of 
them that is includible by reason of having actually reduced taxable 
income in a prior year. This calculation is required where: (a) the de-
duction is subject to a floor, (b) the deduction falls within a class of 
deductions that is subject to a floor, or (c) the taxpayer’s taxable in-
come is reduced to a negative number by the deduction. Refunds oc-
cur mainly with respect to income taxes. If taxes (including income 
taxes) are not deductible at all, then refunds of such taxes would be 
wholly excludible and would not have to be included subject to the 
machinery of § 111. 
3.   Personal Casualty and Theft Losses 
 The standard rationale for this deduction is that personal casualty 
and theft losses constitute a decrease in wealth that is not “consump-
tion.”183 However, in fact consumption under an income tax is viewed 
as occurring when a personal-use asset is purchased, not as and 
when it is used.184 Moreover, the tax system does not otherwise take 
into account deviations of consumption value from cost.  
 As a matter of broader policy, the deduction operates as taxpayer-
subsidized insurance for uninsured losses. The deduction is more 
valuable to high-bracket taxpayers who can best afford to purchase 
property-loss insurance. 
 It is tempting, therefore, to repeal this deduction entirely, and for 
most taxpayers the deduction has already been repealed by reason of 
the floor under the deduction equal to 10% of adjusted gross income. 
Nevertheless, in some cases casualty and theft losses reduce ability 
to pay, and the system should make appropriate allowance in that 
event. Any reduction in ability to pay occurs by reason of having to 
prematurely replace “essential” property. (Such a rationale is the 
same as the “duplicative cost” rationale for deducting business lodg-
ing costs.) Thus, the deduction should be triggered only by the unex-
pected destruction of certain property. The deduction would be the 
lesser of the cost of replacement or the cost of the items being re-
placed, reduced by the sum of net salvage proceeds, insurance pro-
ceeds, and government cash benefits, but not to exceed a specified 
 183. Turnier, supra note 172, at 272. 
 184. Consumption costs, whether expenses or capital expenditures, are taxed by being 
nondeductible. The nondeductible (and non-depreciable) cost of a personal-use asset repre-
sents the present value of its future estimated consumption value. Actual consumption 
with respect to such assets is not taxed as it occurs. 
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fixed-dollar figure. “Replacement cost” would include unreimbursed 
costs of lodging for a maximum period of, say, one year. 
 If the deduction is not repealed or further cut back, the following 
simplification reforms are suggested. 
 First, valuation “after” the casualty should not play any role in 
cases where the item is not disposed of and is repaired or rehabilitat-
ed. The valuation of, say, a wrecked automobile is pointless, because 
a wrecked automobile has no economic use, except as salvage. In such 
a case, the repair costs (not to exceed the cost of the property), re-
duced by recoveries, should be treated conclusively as the tentatively 
deductible amount. Of course, if the item is abandoned or sold         
for scrap, the loss amount is the adjusted basis reduced by any   
monetary recovery. 
 Second, no deduction should be allowed for losses attributable to 
unrealized appreciation. Hence, the tentatively deductible amount 
should be reduced by the excess, if any, of the pre-loss value over the 
adjusted basis of the item. 
 Third, it is not clear why casualty and theft losses are allowed to 
avoid the existing floor by first being netted against recognized casu-
alty and theft gains.185 Personal consumption losses should not offset 
recognized gains that are essentially investment gains (other ave-
nues exist for nonrecognition of personal casualty and theft gains, 
namely, §§ 121 and 1033). This netting rule echoes that of § 1231, but 
§ 1231 would be eliminated under a proposal made above. Also, no 
good reason exists why recognized personal casualty gains should 
obtain capital gains treatment, as occurs under § 165(h) when such 
gains exceed such losses. The issue of loss deductibility should have 
priority over that of character. The portion of § 165(h) relating to 
whether the casualty and theft deduction is an itemized deduction or 
an above-the-line deduction would be rendered moot by the abolition 
of that distinction. Accordingly, § 165(h) should be mostly repealed, 
leaving only the floor under the deduction (if retained) in place.  
4.   Charitable Contributions 
 The charitable deduction has been critiqued (and defended) from 
many angles, but the only consensus reform proposal is to limit the 
deduction with respect to donations of appreciated property to the 
taxpayer’s basis across the board. (As to depreciated-value property, 
presumably the deduction should be limited to value.) Certainly it is 
 185. The 1982 Act revised § 165 so that the 10% floor applied to all casualty and theft 
losses. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. 
The 1984 Act introduced the complex rules of § 165(h) as a technical correction, apparently 
designed to cull personal casualty theft and casualty gains and losses out of § 1231. Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. 
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hard to justify the various distinctions found in § 170(e), which limits 
the deduction to basis in some cases but not others.186 This reform 
would advance the cause of simplification of the income tax. 
 Apart from the issue of appreciated-property contributions, the 
charitable deduction should be subject to a floor, equal to, say, 2% of 
net income.187 Viewed instrumentally, the charitable deduction is an 
incentive to give, but nontax incentives also exist, and it is likely that 
people would give modest amounts to charity without a tax incentive. 
A modest floor should actually increase incentives to give at the mar-
gin. Moreover, a floor would also eliminate a good deal of trivia (and 
potential valuation disputes) from the system. 
 Valuation of utilitarian tangible personal property imposes a con-
siderable administrative burden on the tax system. Such property is 
virtually certain to have depreciated greatly in value and is likely to 
be slated for abandonment in any event. The donor is hardly incur-
ring any kind of sacrifice by giving these items to a charity, because 
such items have already been consumed by the donor. Thus, the ra-
tionale for any deduction at all in this scenario is very weak and can 
only survive by supposing both that it is socially better that these 
items end up in the hands of charity rather than a waste disposal site 
and that potential donors would prefer (in the absence of a tax incen-
tive) to destroy rather than give. Consideration should be given to 
authorizing the IRS to issue a valuation table that confers a small (or 
zero) per item value on such property.188 Alternatively, the deduction 
could simply be disallowed for donations of tangible personal proper-
ty worth less than, say, $200 per item.189 
 For items of utilitarian tangible personal property that possess 
significant value and that could either be sold or used by the charity 
(such as cars, boats, furniture, and computers), a deemed-
consignment approach is appropriate: the donor would simply obtain 
a deduction in the year of sale by the charity in an amount equal to 
 186. Roughly speaking, the deduction equals basis for (1) property held for less than 
one year, (2) property given to a private (non-operating) foundation, and (3) tangible per-
sonal property not to be used by the donee for its exempt function. The latter category was 
sufficiently abused that Congress was forced to enact § 170(e)(7) in 2006. 
 187. That is, only aggregate contributions in excess of 2% would be deductible. Higher 
(10% of AGI) floors already exist under the medical expense deduction, I.R.C. § 213(a), and 
the deduction for personal casualty losses, id. § 165(h)(2)(A). Additionally, a 2%-of-AGI 
floor exists under aggregate “miscellaneous itemized deductions.” Id. § 67(a). 
 188. Section 170(f)(16), added in 2006, disallows a deduction for clothing and certain 
household items that are in “good used condition or better.” Id. § 170(f)(16). However, this 
standard is imprecise and probably unenforceable. The same section allows the IRS to is-
sue a regulation that treats contributed clothing or certain household items of “minimal 
monetary value” as being worth zero, but no such regulation has been issued, and, again, 
the standard is vague. Id. 
 189. Cf. id. § 165(h)(1) (throwing out the first $100 of losses per casualty or theft 
event). 
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the charity’s net sales proceeds.190 It might be objected that the donee 
might actually use the property, in which case the sales price might 
turn out to be much lower than the value at the time of contribution. 
However, since charities have a long history of accommodating do-
nors at the expense of the IRS, a charity’s representations to a donor 
as to its intentions are unreliable (and unenforceable by the IRS). 
Hence, the donation rule should induce the charity to sell the donat-
ed item in the market and spend the cash on whatever it desires. 
 Another possible reform proposal (possessing a simplification an-
gle) would be to eliminate any income tax deduction for a contribu-
tion that will benefit the charity only at or after the donor’s death, 
generically referred to as a “charitable remainder transfer.”191 The 
income tax is an annual tax, and there is no reason why a donor 
should obtain an income tax deduction in the current year for a 
transfer not reduced to possession or use by the charity during the 
year in question, especially if the donor (or the natural object of the 
donor’s bounty) is enjoying the property in the meantime. The charity 
really receives no useable value until the retained interest expires. 
The income tax is not bound to follow the law of future interests. 
Charitable remainder interests are hard to value, and techniques ex-
ist to overvalue the charitable remainder interest relative to the non-
deductible retained interest. 
 The ceilings on the charitable deduction are complex and overlap-
ping. Additionally, concern exists that the charitable deduction can 
be combined with other personal deductions (as well as the personal 
and dependency exemptions) to virtually zero-out the donor’s tax lia-
bility. This problem can be eliminated by imposing a single ceiling as 
a percentage of taxable income (without regard to the charitable de-
duction itself). In other words, other deductions would operate to 
lower the ceiling on the charitable deduction. 
5.   Medical Care 
 The deduction for medical care, subject to a 10% floor of adjusted 
gross income, is for uninsured medical costs paid by an individual for 
herself, her spouse, and her dependents.192 The floor can effectively 
 190. A rule of this type already exists in § 170(f)(12), added in 2006, but only for vehi-
cles, boats, and airplanes, and it does not apply to vehicles or airplanes if the donee under-
takes “significant intervening use or material improvement.” Id. § 170(f)(12)(A)(ii). This 
provision is unnecessarily complex, requires paperwork to be provided to the donee and the 
IRS, and appears to contemplate the possible amendment of the donor’s tax returns. More-
over, it is not clear why it is limited to vehicles, boats, and airplanes. 
 191. A cognate device is the “direct charitable annuity,” in which a contribution is 
made in return for an annuity payable by the charity. A unique problem with this device is 
that the “donor” benefits from the charitable tax exemption in the form of increased annui-
ty payments (relative to the commercial norm). 
 192. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9013, 124 
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be avoided through medical savings accounts, employer health plans, 
self-employment health insurance, and (to some extent) self-
purchased insurance.193 The floor renders the deduction useless for 
most of those taxpayers unable to avoid it. 
 The Code section allowing the deduction, § 213, has become some-
thing of a Christmas tree by reason of being worded in such a way 
that allows the scope of the deduction to expand endlessly to include 
borderline items that have more to do with desires than objective 
health needs.194 The problem is aggravated by the fact that no politi-
cal constituency appears to favor the elimination or containment of 
this deduction. Nevertheless, the deduction (if retained) should be 
limited to costs for, say, the prevention or cure of disease, the allevia-
tion (other than by over-the-counter drugs) of chronic or abnormal 
pain, or the correction of a non-self-inflicted work-disabling physical 
defect or condition. 
 Current health policy favors near-universal coverage through pri-
vate insurance. It is surprising that the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act of 2010 did not enact an above-the-line deduction 
for self-purchased health insurance, a move that would have further 
eroded the significance of § 213. Instead, what the Act gave us was a 
tax subsidy, effective starting in 2014, for persons (above the eligibil-
ity level for Medicaid but below an amount that is four times the ap-
plicable poverty level) who purchase health insurance through “ex-
changes” in the form of a refundable tax credit found in § 36B.195    
The credit is extremely complex, and it will undoubtedly require               
a worksheet. 
6.   Costs of Tax Planning and Compliance 
 A good case can be made for eliminating the deduction conferred 
by § 212(3) for costs relating to taxes. This deduction has already 
been partially repealed by virtue of having been categorized as a mis-
Stat. 119, 868 (2010) (amending I.R.C. § 213). 
 193. All except the last have the effect of allowing a deduction for the insurance premi-
um, I.R.C. §§ 106, 162(l), 223, plus a tax-free reimbursement for health care costs. The last 
scenario entails a nondeductible premium combined with such tax-free reimbursement. 
Reimbursements are tax-free under § 104(a)(3) or § 223(f). Id. §§ 104(a)(3), 223(f). 
 194. The deduction is overbroad in defining medical care to entail costs relating not to 
only diseases, but also to costs “affecting any structure or function of the body.” Id. 
§ 213(d)(1)(A). The over-broadness is compounded by the tendency of the medical and, es-
pecially, the mental health professions to expand the definition of “disease” to encompass 
virtually any biological or mental condition that inhibits the attainment of an individual’s 
personal goals. See O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 34 (2010), acq., 2011-47 I.R.B. 
789 (Nov. 21, 2011) (allowing deduction for sex change surgery because “gender identity 
disorder” is now a “disease” recognized by the mental health profession). 
 195. Premiums (up to the credit amount) will not also be deductible as medical expens-
es. I.R.C. § 280C(g). 
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cellaneous itemized deduction,196 and it now chiefly operates to sub-
sidize tax litigation (including criminal tax fraud defense) and tax 
planning for the wealthy. Despite the fact that tax planning costs are 
not within the language of the existing statute, the IRS has decided 
otherwise, without satisfactory explanation.197 Other costs of non-
business litigation are not deductible. 
 As a matter of income tax theory, a cost incurred to reduce a non-
deductible cost (such as a federal tax) should not be deducted.198 
E.   Personal Injury Recoveries 
 Under current law, recoveries for personal physical injuries are 
excluded under § 104(a)(2).199 Other tort and tort-like recoveries (in-
cluding punitive damages and compensatory damages for nonphysi-
cal injuries) are included. No persuasive rationale exists for the ex-
clusion.200 If the exclusion is based upon solicitude for plaintiffs, tax-
ing damages can be overcome by grossing up tort recoveries. The ex-
clusion for plaintiffs can be captured (in whole or in part) by defend-
ants, resulting in failure to internalize fully the social costs of the tort. 
 The distinction between included and excluded damages in turn 
determines the deductibility of attorney fees and other costs of ob-
taining recoveries, because only costs allocable to included recoveries 
are deductible.201 Since most tort claims are settled, and since private 
settlement allocations cannot be trusted (no party desires an alloca-
tion to punitive damages), it devolves upon tax trial courts to under-
take the onerous and costly task of adjudicating the tort claim in or-
der to make an allocation. 
 These issues can be solved in a fashion that simplifies the tax law 
by making all personal injury recoveries includible. In that case, all 
costs of obtaining such recoveries (which are really capital expendi-
tures)202 would be deductible. 
 196. Also, if the deduction reduces taxable income, it is added back to AMT taxable 
income. 
 197. See Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (noting IRS concession of this 
issue), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 1 (Dec. 31, 1973). 
 198. A refund of federal income taxes is excluded from income on account of the fact 
that the overpaid tax was not deductible. Costs of obtaining excluded income (or non-
income) are not deductible. See I.R.C. § 265(a)(1). Any deduction here can only offset unre-
lated income. Planning strategies resulting in a reduction of nondeductible federal taxes 
have the same effect as a refund of overpaid nondeductible federal taxes. 
 199. Id. § 104(a). 
 200. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1992). 
 201. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (disallowing expenses of obtaining excluded income). 
 202. See Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting of Costs Against Income Receipts (Including 
Damage Recoveries) Produced by Such Costs, Without Barring Congress from Disallowing 
Such Costs, 27 VA. TAX REV. 297 (2007). 
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F.   Retirement Savings 
 Explicit statutory tax favoritism for savings vehicles exists for cer-
tain funded qualified retirement vehicles, herein referred to as “qual-
ified plans,” but the benefit of tax deferral is also obtainable under 
certain nonqualified (funded and non-funded) arrangements. 
1.   Qualified Tax-Deferral Retirement Plans 
 Except for Roth IRAs,203 the basic pattern for qualified retirement 
savings vehicles under current law is to allow tax-free contributions 
to an account to be excluded (or included and deducted) by the ac-
count owner, the earnings on the account to be tax free, and for the 
payouts to be fully taxed.204 
(a)   Complexity in the Service of an Ineffective Policy Design 
 At the individual taxpayer level, the “complexity problem” with 
current law is the proliferation of tax-favored plan types with assort-
ed requirements pertaining to qualification, taxpayer eligibility, maxi-
mum contributions, minimum and maximum distributions, and more.205 
Simplification could begin by consolidation of the various existing 
plan types,206 especially those used by small business owners and 
self-employed individuals. But tinkering with the existing system is 
not ambitious enough and may result in further complications.207 
 203. Roth IRAs generate tax-exempt income from nondeductible contributions, I.R.C. 
§ 408A, and therefore do not fall within the category of “tax-deferral plans.” 
 204. The tax favoritism consists of a deduction for worker contributions to the plan, 
contrary to the capitalization principle. Alternatively, an employer’s contribution to a 
funded plan benefitting the employee is excludible by the employee, but exclusion is the 
equivalent of inclusion (as compensation for services) and full offsetting deductibility. 
 205. A good introduction to the system, along with reform proposals, is found in Nor-
man P. Stein, An Alphabet Soup Agenda for Reform of the Internal Revenue Code and 
ERISA Provisions Applicable to Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 56 SMU L. REV. 
627 (2003).  
 206. Qualified plans can be classified according to method of contribution, calculation 
of benefits, or unique qualification rules, and various categories often overlap or hybridize. 
Besides Roth IRAs, the following types of plans can be qualified: regular IRAs, “SIMPLE” 
IRAs, cash or deferred § 401(k) plans, regular pension plans, cash-balance defined benefit 
plans, pension equity plans, simplified employee pension plans (SEPs), salary-reduction 
pension plans, profit-sharing defined contribution plans, target-benefit (defined contribu-
tion) plans, age-weighted profit-sharing (defined contribution) plans, money purchase (de-
fined contribution) plans, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), non-ESOP stock bonus 
plans, top-heavy plans, annuity § 403(a) plans, exempt-organization annuity § 403(b) 
plans, and state and local government § 457 plans. See I.R.C. §§ 219, 401(k), 403(b), 408(k), 
408(p), 457. The rules pertaining (mostly) to plan qualification occupy 338 pages in the 
Code alone (the 2012 CCH edition). 
 207. A retirement income simplification/reform proposal submitted by the American 
Bar Association Tax Section was released on October 3, 2012. Letter from Rudolph R. 
Ramelli, Chair of the A.B.A. Section of Taxation, & Charles H. Egerton, Former Chair of 
the A.B.A. Section of Taxation, to Chairmen and Ranking Members of the S. Comm. on Fin. & 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
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 The task of meaningful simplification can be approached by way of 
focusing on the underlying policy rationale for the existing system, 
which is explicitly that of retirement security.208 The existing system, 
overall, is currently embodied in both the Social Security retirement 
system and the law that governs privately funded retirement plans 
(the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 as amended, 
known as ERISA).209 Non-workers, ranging from the chronically un-
employed to wealthy investors, lie beyond the scope of retirement in-
come security policy.210 
 A possible approach is to eliminate tax-favored plans entirely and 
to expand the Social Security retirement system so that it provides 
an adequate level of wage replacement in retirement for all or most of 
the workforce.211 Nevertheless, the discussion herein will proceed on 
the twin assumptions that the Social Security program will continue 
and that retirement security in excess of Social Security will be pri-
vately funded.212 
 In the context of a privately funded system that supplements So-
cial Security, the concept of retirement income security has two 
prongs. One is financial security through funding, vesting, nonalien-
ability, plan insurance (for defined benefit plans), and portability, 
dam/aba/administrative/taxation/100312letter.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 208. An alternative means of simplification would be to allow universal tax-free sav-
ings accounts, but that move would not only entail a major shift towards a cash-flow con-
sumption tax, but would also undermine the goal of income security, as described infra in 
the text accompanying notes 250-51. 
 209. The non-tax provisions of ERISA are located at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006). The 
historical evolution of the pension system in the U.S. is recounted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET 
AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 44-63 (5th ed. 2010). 
 210. It should be noted here that a federal needs-based program, Supplemental Securi-
ty Income (SSI), provides benefits to low-income persons over age sixty-five, as well as to 
the disabled and blind. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1) (2006). In contrast, Social Security retire-
ment benefits are not conditioned on need. Id. § 402(a). 
 211. It appears that many affluent countries provide a more extensive government-
funded pension system than does the United States, where the wage replacement rate 
provided by Social Security appears to be fairly modest. Specifically, the wage replacement 
rate has been roughly 45% for lowest-quintile wage earners and about 33% for middle-
quintile workers, with further declines in the two highest quintiles. See Alan Fox, Earnings 
Replacement Rates and Total Income: Results from the Retirement History Study, 45 SOC. 
SEC. BULL., Oct. 1982, at 3, 13 (mid-1970s data), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/ 
docs/ssb/v45n10/v45n10p3.pdf; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 38-39. The 
Social Security retirement income program (which is not really contingent on retirement as 
such) is part of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) federal program. 
To be eligible, a person must contribute to the program for a specified period. Contributions 
are withheld by employers for employees. See I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111. Self-employed persons 
contribute by way of the self-employment tax. See id. §§ 1401-1403. Current contributions 
fund current benefits, so that the program operates on a pay-as-you go basis, as opposed to 
an investment basis. 
 212. Under current demographic assumptions, the Social Security program is, if un-
changed, expected to run a large deficit in the future, and, in any event, benefits are esti-
mated to represent a lower rate of return on contributions than would be the case with 
privately-funded plans. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 41-43. 
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many of which can be (and are) achieved simply by federal govern-
ment mandates under ERISA, as amended, but which are also incor-
porated into the tax qualification rules.213 The second prong of the 
policy is that of covering virtually the entire workforce. This second 
aim is merely touched upon by legal mandate.214 Instead, it is almost 
exclusively the aim of the tax rules,215 which is to incentivize employ-
ers to offer broad-coverage retirement plans (which, inside the firm, 
are often mandatory for covered employees), with a secondary pur-
pose to incentivize non-covered workers to save for retirement.216 Un-
fortunately, the present system of qualified plans has only brought 
retirement plan coverage up to about half of the workforce, and this 
coverage is heavily weighted towards high-income employees.217 The 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the present system are legion, but 
the root of the problem is that employers are not required to adopt 
qualified plans, nor are non-covered workers required to create their 
own plan. Employers willing to adopt a plan can (and do) effectively 
avoid covering large portions of their workforce by hiring workers as 
independent contractors or less-than-half-time workers.218 Addition-
ally, unionized workers can be excluded,219 and benefits and contribu-
tions for employees under qualified plans can be integrated with So-
cial Security, thereby effectively reducing plan coverage for low-paid 
workers.220 Also, the qualification rules themselves contain loopholes 
 213. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1), (2), (7). 
 214. Basically, the legal mandate is that an employer adopting a plan can exclude only 
part-time employees, employees under the age of twenty-one, or employees with less than 
one year of service. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). The same rule appears (in substance) as 
§ 410(a) of the tax Code. See I.R.C. § 410(a). 
 215. A “minimum coverage” nondiscrimination rule is located at I.R.C. § 410(b). Addi-
tionally, contributions or benefits must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated 
employees. Id. § 401(a)(4). Finally, caps exist on contributions and benefits, id. § 415(b)-(c), 
which operate mainly to the detriment of high-salary employees. 
 216. See Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Inten-
tions Confront Economic Reality, in PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW, supra note 209, 
at 402, 402-05. For an account of the enactment of ERISA that stresses the political moti-
vations, see S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1-25 (Comm. Print 1984) (Chapter 1, Overview: 
Why Was ERISA Enacted? written by Michael S. Gordon). For a more cynical view, see 
John H. Langbein, Social Security and the Private Pension System, in IN SEARCH OF RE-
TIREMENT SECURITY 109 (Teresa Ghilarducci et al. eds., 2004) (describing the effect of the 
system as being a stealth program to allow high-income earners to accumulate wealth at 
low tax rates). 
 217. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 25-30. 
 218. The term “employee” is not actually defined in ERISA, but in Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), the Supreme Court held that independent 
contractors are excluded. See also Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(c)-(d); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 
296. Employees who work less than twenty hours per week are effectively not considered to 
be employees. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(3). For a comprehensive discussion of excludible employ-
ees, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 209, at 412-15. 
 219. I.R.C. § 410(b)(3)(A). 
 220. See generally Keith A. Bender, Characteristics of Individuals with Integrated Pen-
sions, 62 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 3, 1999, at 28 (noting that integration is allowed in part so 
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that allow non-coverage of (especially) low-compensation employ-
ees.221 Finally, the most widely used plan type for self-employed per-
sons is the § 401(k) type of defined contribution plan, which itself is 
elective on an annual basis. 
 Technicalities aside, the tax incentives for employers and non-
covered workers are too feeble. The only current tax inducement to 
the employer is a current deduction for cash transfers to qualified 
employee trusts,222 but a current deduction for cash transfers already 
accords with income tax norms, and such treatment operates as an 
incentive only because Congress has imposed an artificial tax disin-
centive for nonqualified funded plans.223 The more salient employer 
tax incentive consists of offering the tax benefits attendant upon 
qualified plans to highly compensated employees (who presumably 
control company policy) on condition, by way of nondiscrimination 
rules, that they offer qualified plans to rank-and-file employees. This 
indirect, trickle-down, approach is wasteful for several reasons. First, 
employer-maintained retirement plans for employees below the top 
tier would exist to a fair degree without tax benefits on account of the 
dynamics of employee recruitment and collective bargaining.224 Sec-
ond, the cost—lost tax revenue—attendant on bribing high-level em-
ployees is high, whereas the incentive is weak, because highly-paid 
employees—who already have the capacity to save—can achieve 
equivalent or better tax results through other forms of deferred com-
pensation, such as nonqualified arrangements, incentive stock op-
tions, and carried interests.225 Third, the net cost of covering lower-
income employees may outweigh the net tax benefits for high-salary 
employees.226 Fourth, workers at the bottom may oppose coverage 
solely on the ground of a perception (perhaps accurate) that contribu-
tions reduce current cash wages dollar for dollar. Fifth, various ac-
tors (non-covered employees, self-employed workers, small business 
owners, and unprofitable businesses) may under-appreciate the bene-
fits of wage-deferral.227 
that the sum of Social Security and qualified plan benefits do not exceed the worker’s wages). 
 221. Qualification for tax benefits is conditioned on compliance with nondiscrimination 
rules, I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b), the ineffectiveness of which is critiqued in Peter Orszag & 
Norman Stein, Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans: A Response to Professor Zelinsky, 
49 BUFF. L. REV. 629 (2001). 
 222. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)-(4) (providing limits on such current deductions). 
 223. See id. § 404(a)(5) (deferring the employer deduction for nonqualified plans until 
employee inclusion). 
 224. Unions that obtain pension plans can justify their existence, while the employer 
can pass all or a portion of the cost thereof on its workforce and other parties. 
 225. These devices achieve not only income deferral but also result in capital gains 
treatment for gain that is essentially compensation for services. 
 226. See Wolk, supra note 216, at 402-05. 
 227. A worker without other income at retirement will benefit from shifting income 
from higher current rate brackets into lower tax rate brackets after retirement. Additional-
ly, under certain assumptions (including one of constant tax rates over time), deducting the 
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 The foregoing calls into question whether employers should be the 
focal point of retirement income policy. It is certainly the case that 
employers are not needed as administrators of funded plans; finan-
cial institutions are better positioned to perform this function, as well 
as that of investment guidance. 
(b)   Plan A: Mandatory Retirement Contributions 
 One simple alternative to the present system is that of mandatory 
contributions228 by employers and self-employed persons to privately 
run individual-account annuity plans that satisfy the essential condi-
tions of retirement income security.229 Some sweeteners might be re-
quired to induce Congress to adopt such an approach, such as waiv-
ers for employees covered by existing plans, tax credits to employers 
to cover a portion of incremental administrative costs, government 
subsidies for low-wage contributors, and opt-out provisions for high-
income workers.230 
 The simplification advantage of this approach is obvious: tax-
deferral incentives would be unnecessary,231 although tax deferral 
could still be conferred as a way of increasing the amount of future 
retirement distributions. 
(c)   Plan B: Tax Subsidies at the Margin 
 The other option is to design more effective tax (or other) mecha-
nisms to achieve the goal of near-universal retirement income securi-
investment and including distributions in full—the paradigm for qualified plans—produces 
the same after-tax amount as not deducting the investment but fully exempting the net 
economic return. 
 228. The contribution would be a specified percentage of a worker’s wages. The per-
centage could vary with the hourly wage rate, but design issues such as this are beyond the 
scope of a piece on income tax simplification. 
 229. See generally PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD 
A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY (1981); Tax Analysts, Clinton Details Universal 
Savings Accounts, Including 401(k) Matches, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 72-1; Daniel 
Halperin, Retirement Income Security After the Fall, in 2009 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ch. 11, § 11.09 (2009) (calling for direct govern-
ment contributions to accounts for low-income workers, to make up for the fact that man-
datory contributions would be likely to result in a reduction in wages). 
 230. A proposal loosely based on these premises, known as the “Universal, Secure, and 
Adaptable (“USA”) Retirement Funds,” is set out in TOM HARKIN, U.S. S. COMM. ON 
HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, THE RETIREMENT CRISIS AND A PLAN TO SOLVE IT 
(2012), available at http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/5011b69191eb4.pdf. A 
similar proposal was made in the 2013 Obama Administration Budget Proposal, see OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 147 (2012), 
available at http://www.gpa.gov/fdsyspkg/BUDGET-2013-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2013-BUD.pdf. 
A feature of these proposals is to transfer investment decisions from individual account 
holders to professional fiduciaries. 
 231. Social Security contributions (taxes) paid by an employee are not deductible, 
I.R.C. § 275(a)(1), and distributions are mostly includible under a complex formula, see id. 
§ 85, that is critiqued supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
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ty. Simplification could be obtained by positing a single vehicle for 
providing such security, which would be the worker-owned Qualified 
Retirement Account (QRA). Any person having compensation income 
during the year would be eligible to contribute to such an account, 
managed by an independent administrator. The QRA would automat-
ically possess the attributes of funding, vesting, and portability. The 
tax treatment of such accounts would generally follow the present 
model of tax deferral. Aggregate additions to a worker’s QRA (by the 
worker’s employers and/or the worker herself) for a given year would 
be a specified percentage of salary, say, 6%, subject to a fixed-dollar 
cap.232 Excess additions would not be deductible or excludible (as the 
case may be), but would create a tax basis in the account. 
 However, if the QRA approach were solely dependent on voluntary 
worker contributions, the broad-coverage aspect of retirement-
income-security policy would essentially be blown off. Tax provisions 
designed to incentivize broad coverage would reintroduce complexi-
ties into the system, but it is hoped that these complexities can be 
minimized. Perhaps the most effective means of broadening coverage 
within a QRA system would be to induce employers to provide man-
datory QRAs for all of its employees, under which employers would 
directly transfer cash to the worker QRAs.233 The optimal tax mecha-
nisms for accomplishing this goal are not self-evident, but some sug-
gestions follow. Some tax benefits should be aimed at employers di-
rectly. Among possibilities to be considered are: (1) a modest tax cred-
it to “compensate” the employer for its trouble,234 (2) a current em-
ployer deduction, as under current law, along with a deduction-
equivalent credit for non-profitable employers. Additionally, a possi-
ble “stick” would be to wholly disallow deferred compensation tax de-
ductions for employers failing to adopt a mandatory QRA plan. A 
possible tax incentive for highly-compensated management to sup-
port an employer-sponsored QRA plan would be to provide that adop-
tion of such a plan would result in replacement of the normal fixed-
dollar cap on annual QRA contributions by a gradual decrease (above 
the cap amount) in the specified contribution percentage as compen-
sation increases. Thus, if the basic annual contribution limit is 8% of 
compensation (up to $400,000) not to exceed $32,000 (8% of 
$400,000), then top management of a company adopting a mandatory 
plan would be allowed to make additional contributions to their indi-
 232. Under current law, the maximum contribution to an employer-sponsored defined 
contribution plan is the lesser of 100% of “compensation” or $40,000 (as indexed for infla-
tion). See I.R.C. § 415(c) (the limit was $51,000 in 2013). 
 233. Amounts within the limitation would be excluded by the worker if provided by the 
employer and deductible if provided by the employee. Presumably employer contributions, 
if any, would count first in applying the limitation. 
 234. Cf. I.R.C. § 45E (credit for small employer pension start-up costs). 
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vidual QRAs at a rate of, say, 6% on the next $200,000 of compensa-
tion, 4% on the next $200,000, and so on.  
 The foregoing may be insufficient to bring employees of small 
businesses, moderate-to-low income business owners, and other self-
employed persons into the fold. For non-covered low-income workers, 
an additional refundable credit might be offered for voluntary worker 
contributions to a QRA, somewhat along the lines of that provided by 
§ 25B.235 The credit can be expressed as a percentage of contributions 
to a QRA, not to exceed a fixed dollar amount.236 
 (d)   Defined Benefit Plans 
 Not to be overlooked are employer-funded defined benefit pension 
plans,237 as opposed to the individual account plans discussed above. 
Defined benefit plans are particularly attractive in terms of retire-
ment-income-security policy insofar as benefits are typically ex-
pressed as a percentage of wages, and investment risk is borne by the 
employer instead of the worker.238 Such plans essentially constitute 
in-house non-profit annuity companies that require a large actuarial 
pool. Qualified defined benefit (pension) plans should continue to ex-
ist,239 but tax simplification does not appear to be a significant con-
cern here for individual taxpayers. 
(e)   Mandatory Annuity Pay-Outs Under All Tax-Favored Plans 
 By definition, retirement security entails a funded individual an-
nuity that serves to continue wages (or a portion thereof) after re-
tirement or a specified age until a worker’s death, to protect against 
the risk of longevity. It follows that annuity pay-outs should be man-
datory for all subsidized retirement vehicles.  
  
 235. The § 25B credit, however, is nonrefundable, meaning that it has no effect on low-
income workers. Id. § 25B. 
 236. A tax credit proposal was provided by a group known as Retirement USA. See 
Proposals for a New Retirement System, RETIREMENT USA (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://www.retirement-usa.org/proposals-new-retirement-system. A prominent academic 
commentator favoring this approach is Halperin, supra note 229, § 11.06. 
 237. Such plans, which require a large pool of participants, provide salary-replacement 
payments based on a formula relating to salary history and years of participation. 
 238. However, portability (avoiding the loss of benefits by reason of changing employ-
ers), which is also an aspect of retirement security, is hard to achieve in the case of defined 
benefit plans except by converting an accrued benefit right into a lump-sum amount that 
can be rolled over into a defined-contribution plan. 
 239. As under present law, I.R.C. § 415(b)(1), annual annuity distributions should be 
capped at a specified amount. 
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 Additionally, and contrary to present law,240 a beneficiary of any 
qualified plan should not be able to withdraw amounts from a QRA 
before retirement age, except perhaps for permanent disability.241 
(f)   Other Issues 
 Numerous other issues would need to be dealt with, including the 
definition of “employee” for purposes of the ERISA tax rules,242 possi-
ble provision for non-working spouses of working spouses,243 surviv-
ing spouses and dependents of workers both before and after the 
commencement of annuity pay-outs,244 and divorced spouses. 
 (g)   Roth IRAs 
 The Roth IRA, instead of deferral, gives a tax-free return on an 
after-tax investment.245 Roth IRAs do not conform to the retirement-
income-security paradigm because tax-exemption after retirement (as 
opposed to claiming deductions while working) is preferable to tax 
deferral only if the owner already has post-retirement taxable income 
in significant amounts. Additionally, Roth IRAs do not require annui-
ties or even minimal distribution rules, and they allow contributions 
even after retirement age.246 In short, Roth IRAs do not advance the 
policy of retirement income security and function mainly to allow the 
 240. An annuity is not required for defined contribution plans (including IRAs, § 401(k) 
plans, and § 403(b) plans), which currently outweigh defined benefit plans in terms of  
coverage. 
 241. The current system imposes a 10% penalty on pre-retirement distributions but 
allows for numerous exceptions. I.R.C. § 72(t). The only exception should lie for permanent 
disability (premature forced retirement), which can be monitored by the Social Security 
Administration and can trigger conversion into an individual annuity. Insurance problems 
(such as a medical emergency) should be dealt with, if at all, by other mechanisms. 
 242. Currently, “employee” is defined in Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(c)-1(d), which also serves 
as the definition for income tax withholding and payroll tax purposes. The definition 
adopts a modified common-law fact-based “control” test. Perhaps the test could itself be 
simplified. See Calvin H. Johnson, Settle Withholding by the Dollars, Not Control, 136 TAX 
NOTES 949 (2012). 
 243. A large percentage of spouses will be employed on their own and will thereby be 
eligible to contribute to their own qualified plans. It is appropriate that a non-working 
spouse of a working spouse should be able to contribute to her own QRA on the ground that 
she is being implicitly paid for domestic labor. 
 244. The qualified annuity of a person who is married on the annuity starting date 
could be required to be a self-and-survivor annuity for the annuitant and the annuitant’s 
spouse, unless the spouse waives the survivorship right. Such a rule exists for certain qual-
ified plans under current law. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417. Of course, a longer expected 
annuity period results in lower periodic payments. Moreover, a surviving spouse should not 
receive a greater aggregate annuity than the largest of her own annuity or the deceased 
spouse’s annuity. Since the purpose of an annuity is the exact reverse of that of life insur-
ance, a QRA should not provide survivorship benefits (or a refund to the deceased worker’s 
estate) in cases where the QRA owner dies before the annuity starting date. A refund fea-
ture would reduce annuity payments. 
 245. Id. § 408A(c)(1), (d)(1). 
 246. Id. § 408A(c)(4), (5). 
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well-off to augment the amount of their bequests. Accordingly, the 
Roth IRA should be repealed.247 
2.   Nonqualified Tax-Deferral Arrangements 
 For non-qualified employer-provided deferred compensation ar-
rangements, tax deferral can be obtained either if the arrangement is 
unfunded or if the employee’s interest in the plan is funded but sub-
ject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.248 On the other hand, if an em-
ployer confers upon an employee the right and power to obtain cur-
rent cash income, the employee would be in constructive receipt of 
the income (even if the cash is not actually taken) unless a meaning-
ful restriction or penalty would attach to the taking.249 In other 
words, the employee is not currently taxed unless she (a) is in con-
structive receipt of income or (b) receives property (or is a beneficiary 
of an employer-funded trust that receives cash) that is not subject to 
a substantial risk of forfeiture. In general, the readily available op-
portunities for deferral through nonqualified arrangements under-
mine incentives to create qualified plans250 and fail to satisfy the poli-
cy of retirement income security.251 
(a)   Restricted Property Transfers and Funded Nonqualified Plans 
 The general rule is that receipts of cash income are currently in-
cluded, notwithstanding a risk of forfeiture, and any actual forfeiture 
gives rise to a deduction in the year of loss.252 Current § 83(a), which 
provides otherwise for compensation-related receipts of property inter-
ests (including funded deferred compensation),253 came into existence to 
accommodate court decisions that failed to treat receipts of property 
 247. If they are retained, Roth IRAs should be subjected to similar required-
distribution rules as are applicable to tax-deferral plans. 
 248. Section 83(a) states that the transfer of property to a service provider is current 
income unless the property is “subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.” I.R.C. § 83(a). 
Section 402(b) states that the transfer of cash by an employer to a nonqualified deferred 
compensation trust is deemed to be a transfer of property to the employee subject to 
§ 83(a). Id. § 402(b). This provision codifies the tax common law rule known as the econom-
ic benefit doctrine. John F. Cooper, The Economic Benefit Doctrine: How an Unconditional 
Right to a Future Benefit can Cause a Current Tax Detriment, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 270, 273 
(1988). 
 249. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a). 
 250. Nonqualified deferral plans are, by reason of not being subject to a nondiscrimina-
tion requirement, usually limited to highly compensated service providers. Thus, availabil-
ity of such plans undermines the goal of retirement security for most of the workforce. 
 251. An arrangement that is unfunded and/or subject to a substantial risk of forfei-
ture—and is not annuitized—hardly provides for retirement income security. 
 252. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 
U.S. 417, 424 (1932). 
 253. Section 402(b) provides that transfers of cash to a deferred compensation plan 
shall be treated as transfers of property subject to § 83. I.R.C. § 402(b). 
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subject to a significant risk of forfeiture the same as receipts of cash.254 
This differing tax treatment of forfeitable cash and forfeitable proper-
ty is hard to justify as a matter of policy,255 especially where the 
“property” is nothing more than a right to future cash.256 Moreover, 
restrictions on property given as compensation can be viewed as self-
imposed (or at least willingly accepted) by virtue of the benefit of tax 
deferral, and tax deferral for nonqualified arrangements conflicts 
with the overriding policy of retirement income security through 
qualified plans.257 
 The cleanest solution would be to alter § 83 so as to be in accord 
with the treatment of “restricted” cash. Accordingly, the property 
should be included at the time of receipt and valued without regard 
to the restrictions.258 Such a revised § 83 should provide that the    
service provider obtains an ordinary loss deduction upon any         
actual forfeiture. 
 Property that has no ascertainable fair market value on receipt, 
such as nontransferable (and not-in-the-money) stock options and pure 
profits interests, are subject to a different default rule, namely: no in-
clusion until cash receipt (or until the property can be reasonably val-
ued, such as upon the exercise of the option or the obtaining of liquida-
tion rights).259 Current rules generally accord with this principle,260 but 
the principle should be made into a universal rule, which means elimi-
nating the special tax breaks given to incentive stock options (ISOs) 
 254. The doctrinal problem was the notion that the receipt of property as compensa-
tion, although normally an income realization event, avoided current inclusion because the 
forfeiture condition rendered the property incapable of valuation when received (assuming 
that any transferee would also be subject to the forfeiture condition). See Kuchman v. 
Commissioner, 18 T.C. 154 (1952) (holding forfeitable property not currently included). Not 
so justifiable in terms of doctrine was Lehman v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), where 
it was held that no income arose upon the lapse of such a restriction, resulting in deferral 
(and capital gains treatment) until the property was sold. The IRS acquiesced in these 
cases in Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 C.B. 184. Section 83(a), enacted in 1969, deferring com-
pensation until the lapse of the forfeiture restriction, can be described as a compromise 
between this case law and the tax rules for cash. See I.R.C. § 83(a). 
 255. The difference in tax results channels transactions of this sort into the property 
mode. 
 256. The rationale of Kuchman, 18 T.C. at 163, was that forfeitable property was not 
capable of valuation and therefore not currently realized income. See supra the doctrine 
and text accompanying note 254. However, the courts could have treated the restriction as 
being personal and not an aspect of the property itself. However, the restriction can be 
made to be on the property by a provision that all transferees are subject to the restriction. 
In any event, Congress can do what the courts fail to do. 
 257. The argument in favor of § 83 is that forfeiture conditions (usually, leaving the 
firm) align the interests of employee and employer, but this is not a concern of tax policy. 
Moreover, the proposed change in tax treatment does not prohibit such forfeiture          
conditions. 
 258. Current § 83(a) states that non-forfeiture restrictions are to be ignored in valuing 
in-kind compensation. I.R.C. § 83(a). 
 259. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 248 (1956); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7. 
 260. See I.R.C. § 83(e)(3)-(4). 
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and employee stock purchase plans.261 Additionally, any income real-
ized under this type of arrangement should be ordinary income.262 
(b)   Non-Funded Plans 
 The core principle for non-funded, purely contractual deferred 
compensation arrangements is that deferral is obtainable in the ab-
sence of the constructive receipt of cash income, but, as already not-
ed, constructive receipt is easily avoided by imposing a more-than-de-
minimis penalty on demanding current cash. 
 Section 409A, which was enacted in 2004 to deal with certain 
problems relating to nonqualified deferred compensation, is framed 
in these terms: “The [House] Committee believes that certain ar-
rangements that allow participants inappropriate levels of control or 
access to amounts deferred should not result in deferral of income 
inclusion.”263 Section 409A requires current inclusion in gross income, 
with interest and penalties, of nonqualified rights to future compen-
sation (funded or non-funded), unless various anti-abuse rules are 
complied with.264 With regard to non-funded arrangements, § 409A 
has effectively expanded the constructive receipt doctrine by requir-
ing immediate inclusion of rights to future cash unless the arrange-
ment (1) prohibits last-minute deferral decisions and elective acceler-
ations of deferred benefits and (2) requires deferred amounts to be 
distributed only upon objectively determinable occurrences.265 
 Section 409A is considered to be an excessively complex and open-
ended response to the stated abuses.266 The governing concept here 
should be that tax deferral of salary is essentially not justified at all 
for tax reasons unless pursuant to a government mandate or under a 
funded qualified plan, while acknowledging that certain rights to fu-
ture cash cannot be currently taxed due to future contingencies. Ac-
cordingly, deferral should be “allowed” for non-funded arrangements 
only if (a) no short-term cash-or-deferral elections are available and 
(b) the plan prohibits—and does not in fact make—distributions on 
 261. See id. §§ 83(e)(1), 421-424 (providing for no taxation until the sale of the stock, 
with any gain being capital gain). 
 262. Deferred compensation that is tied to changes in stock prices is apparently within 
the scope of § 409A. Id. § 409A. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A), (C), a nonqualified 
stock option may be exempt if it (a) is not in the money when granted or (b) is “service re-
cipient stock” (common stock of the employer). Section 409A, if it is retained in any form, 
should not apply to nonqualified stock options, since the exercise of an option is not a dis-
tribution, nor does it represent an ability to obtain the employer’s cash.  
 263. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 343 (2d Sess. 2004). 
 264. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 265. See id. § 409A(a)(2)-(4). These rules also apply to funded arrangements, but in that 
context they would be irrelevant if forfeiture conditions could no longer achieve deferral. 
 266. The proposed regulations under § 409A take up 103 pages in the 2013 CCH Fed-
eral Tax Reporter. Section 409A apparently applies to nonqualified stock options and split-
dollar life insurance arrangements. 
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any occasion other than reaching a certain age or long-term disabil-
ity. In cases where current inclusion would occur except for future 
contingencies that render the right to future cash incapable of valua-
tion, a penalty tax, say, 10%, would be imposed on actual pay-outs. 
 3.   Rabbi Trusts 
 The IRS has held that a Rabbi trust (a funded deferred compensa-
tion trust that is reachable by the employer’s creditors) is not truly 
“funded” for tax purposes,267 and therefore falls into the category of 
contractual deferred compensation. Section 409A(b) taxes to the em-
ployee employer contributions to a Rabbi trust that is offshore and 
any nonqualified deferred compensation amount subject to an em-
ployer’s financial-health contingency.268 These rules partially overlap, 
and it should suffice to provide that financial contingencies of an em-
ployer should not be taken into account in determining that a contri-
bution has been made by an employer to a deferred compensation 
arrangement (i.e., that the trust is funded).269 At this point, deferral 
would be impossible if Congress repeals the rule pertaining to forfei-
ture conditions.270 If the risk-of-forfeiture rule is retained, it should 
be provided that financial and investment risks should themselves 
not be viewed as substantial risks of forfeiture. 
G.   Foreign Income of U.S. Nationals 
 The United States generally taxes U.S. citizens and residents 
(“U.S. nationals”) on worldwide income. If another country happens 
to tax foreign-source income of a U.S. national, the United States 
generally allows a tax credit against the U.S. tax on the same income 
(but not to exceed the average U.S. tax on the same income).271 
1.   Repeal the Exclusion for Foreign-Source Earned Income 
 Current § 911 allows an exclusion from U.S. tax for foreign-source 
personal services (i.e., “earned”) income up to $80,000, as adjusted for 
inflation ($97,600 in 2013), of a U.S. national if the U.S. national has 
 267. See Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107 (Dec. 31, 
1980). 
 268. I.R.C. § 409A(b). 
 269. Since the underlying rule—that funded rights to future cash are current property 
rights—is indifferent to the relationship between the parties (or the nature of the income), 
the rule proposed here should be made applicable to trusts benefitting independent con-
tractors as well as employees. 
 270. However, a funded (defined contribution) nonqualified plan must (generally) fully 
vest within five years. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1053(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). Full vesting removes conditions of forfeiture and would require 
income inclusion under § 83(a). I.R.C. § 83(a). 
 271. I.R.C. §§ 901, 904(a). 
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a “tax” home outside of the U.S. and meets a foreign residency test.272 
The calculation of the exclusion is complicated by a deduction for the 
“foreign housing cost amount,” determined under a formula.273 The 
exclusion is hotly contested in tax policy circles and is the only signif-
icant exception to U.S. taxation of its own nationals. 
 Earned income is foreign-source if the taxpayer performs the ser-
vices abroad.274 The exclusion allows creative talents, consultants, 
and any person who can perform technical services from a non-U.S. 
location to avoid U.S. tax, even if there is no business reason to per-
form these services abroad (or in the country of residence). The in-
come can be earned in a tax haven country that imposes little or no 
tax on the income, or perhaps in a non-tax-haven country that ex-
empts certain types of services income by statute or under an income 
tax treaty with the United States. 
 The argument for the foreign-income exclusion is no stronger than 
that for excluding all foreign-source income (or perhaps foreign-
source business income) of a U.S. individual taxpayer from U.S. 
tax.275 But, if the United States were to move wholesale to a territori-
al system that applied to individual taxpayers, source rules would 
come under scrutiny. The source rule for services is mechanical and 
bears little relationship to U.S. policy interests.276 In the context of 
the prevailing U.S. norm of taxing U.S. nationals on world-wide in-
come, it is hard to see what purpose the § 911 exclusion serves. In the 
current world economic climate, it has little to do with exploiting for-
eign markets or tapping into foreign labor supplies.277 Removing the 
exemption would do no real harm, because the foreign tax credit 
would be available to avoid double taxation of foreign-source earned 
income. Also, income tax treaty provisions can be negotiated with a 
view of curbing host country taxation of temporary visitors.278 
2.   Expand the Simple Version of the Foreign Tax Credit 
 The operation of the foreign tax credit is normally quite complex, 
as it involves the application of “basket limitations” for foreign pas-
 272. Id. § 911 (citizens or residents of the United States living abroad). 
 273. See id. § 911(a)(2), (c). 
 274. Id. § 861(a)(3). 
 275. The tax systems of some prominent trading partners of the United States have a 
territorial slant, especially where corporations are involved. See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. 
ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 446-52, 467-71 (3d ed. 2010). 
 276. The income is sourced where the services are performed, not, say, where the bene-
fit of the services are obtained. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(3). 
 277. The exclusion is critiqued in CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 454-57 (4th ed. 2011). 
 278. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVEN-
TION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, arts. 14, 16 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
trty/model006.pdf. 
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sive income and for other foreign income.279 Individual taxpayers pay-
ing modest amounts of foreign tax should not be involved with these 
complications. Under § 904(k), the foreign tax credit limitations do 
not apply if the taxpayer’s foreign income is entirely passive and the 
creditable foreign taxes do not exceed $300. This provision should be 
liberalized by eliminating the passive income requirement and in-
creasing the maximum foreign tax amount to, say, $1000. 
H.   Entity Taxation 
 The taxation of family business enterprise impacts the taxation of 
individual taxpayers. The discussion below assumes the implementa-
tion of a corporate tax “reform” that includes a reduction in tax rates 
for C corporations relative to individual tax rates.280 Interestingly, 
such a “reform” would create several opportunities for simplification. 
1.   Mandatory Pass-Through Regime for All Non-Publicly Traded 
Business Entities 
 If C corporation tax rates are less than individual tax rates, and if 
the present system is otherwise unchanged, the accumulation/bailout 
game would be revived for closely held entities that elect to do busi-
ness as a C corporation.281 This opportunity can be foreclosed by re-
quiring all non-public business entities and their equity holders to be 
subject to pass-through taxation.282 The liquidity premium incident to 
public trading is what perhaps justifies a separate business entity 
tax to begin with. Accordingly, only publicly traded entities would be 
subject to the (reduced) C corporation tax. No reason exists to condi-
tion pass-through treatment of corporations on having no more     
than a specified number of shareholders, as currently exists with      
S corporations.283 
 279. See I.R.C. § 904(d). 
 280. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat 2313 
(2013), raised the highest individual rate to 39.6%, leaving the highest corporate rate at 
35%. 
 281. The game consists of accumulating corporate earnings at a relatively low tax rate, 
deferring or abstaining from dividend payments, and realizing on the value of the appreci-
ated stock at low individual capital gains rates (with basis offset). Anti-bailout provisions 
were salient features of corporate taxation during periods when the game was being 
played. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (accumulated earnings tax); id. §§ 541-547 (personal 
holding company tax); id. § 341 (repealed) (collapsible corporation provision); id. §§ 302, 
304, 306, 355, 1248 (current Code). 
 282. “Pass-through taxation” means that profits and losses are attributed (passed 
through) to the equity holders, with no tax at the entity level. 
 283. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A), (c) (S corporation cannot have more than 100 share-
holders). A study by the American Law Institute proposes removal of this feature. See 
GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES 170-72 (1999). 
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 It might be argued that pass-through treatment is not appropriate 
for non-public corporations with complex capital structures, because 
here the burden of losses is not settled by contract or organizational 
structure, as it is with a partnership or LLC. The difficulty of profit 
and loss allocation is perhaps overrated. For example, holders of pre-
ferred interests can be taxed like debt-holders,284 and the profit 
shares of other equity interests would be spelled out. The issue of loss 
shares in multi-tier pass-through corporations has been addressed by 
me elsewhere.285 
 Pass-through treatment of non-public corporations would render 
pointless the personal holding company tax and the accumulated 
earnings tax, which could be repealed. The proposed change would 
also simplify the task of entity classification for tax purposes and re-
duce the factors entering into choice of tax entity decisions into     
one, namely, whether equity interests in the entity are to be                 
publicly traded, which is a decision that would normally be made 
on nontax grounds. 
2.   A Simplified Pass-Through Regime 
 Under a mandatory pass-through system for non-public entities, it 
might be desirable to offer separate pass-through regimes, as exists 
under current law: (a) the relatively simple S corporation regime, 
elective for a corporation meeting certain eligibility requirements 
(such as the one-class-of-stock rule), and (b) the complex pass-
through regime for tax partnerships.286 However, an S corporation 
cannot currently elect into Subchapter K, and a partnership (or other 
entity, such as an LLC, that is eligible to be taxed as a partnership) 
cannot elect subchapter S status. 
 It is proposed that non-public business entities be allowed to 
choose between a simple and a complex pass-through regime, or, 
more modestly, that a tax partnership be allowed to elect into Sub-
chapter S (as modified to accommodate partnerships).287 
 284. That is, holders of preferred interests would be taxed on dividends paid (and pos-
sibly dividends accrued), which would be deducted by the entity, thereby reducing pass-
through income. 
 285. See Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-To-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 319-23 (1995). 
 286. See I.R.C. §§ 1366-1377 (operative rules for S corporations); id. §§ 702-761 (opera-
tive rules for entities taxed as partnerships). The differences are explained in Walter D. 
Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do It, 62 TAX LAW. 749 (2009). 
 287. Compare YIN & SHAKOW, supra note 283, at 131-272 (proposing a simplified ver-
sion of conduit taxation for eligible private business organizations that so elect), with 
Schwidetzky, supra note 286 (essentially proposing elimination of Subchapter S). 
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3.   Nondeductibility of C Corporation Interest 
 Under present law, the distinction between corporate debt and 
equity is salient, because interest and dividends carry different tax 
treatment to both the corporate entity288 and the equity holders,289 
resulting in a distortive incentive to use debt.290 Additionally, the dis-
tinction is often difficult to apply in practice, and, being highly fact-
intensive, is costly to administer and uncertain in result.291 From the 
policy angle, the interest deduction can combine with business tax 
preferences to generate a very low, zero, or even negative income tax 
on business earnings derived from capital, resulting in the misalloca-
tion of capital to marginal or bad investments.292 
 These problems can be solved by disallowing interest deductions 
for C corporations—at least those in which capital is a material in-
come-producing factor. This disallowance would be a fair trade-off for 
reducing the corporate tax rate. Indeed, it should generate sufficient 
revenue to enable Congress to enact a truly significant reduction in 
the corporate tax rate.293 
4.   Eliminate Capital Gains Treatment of Dividends 
 Under current law, most dividends received from corporations are 
treated as long-term capital gains.294 This special treatment (along 
with the capital gains preference) operates, as far as corporate equity 
is concerned, as a form of “partial” corporate/shareholder integration 
by significantly reducing the shareholder-level tax. However, it is 
better (in theory) to tax corporate profits at the level of individuals 
receiving distributions, not the entity, because, although it is easy to 
collect tax at the corporate level, the incidence of the corporate tax is 
unknown and could vary among industries and firms.295 Moreover, a 
 288. Interest is generally deductible, I.R.C. § 163(a), whereas dividends are not. 
 289. Interest is ordinary income, whereas “qualified dividend income” is currently 
treated as “net capital gain.” Id. § 1(h)(11)(A). 
 290. The tax incentive to use debt financing often overwhelms nontax factors in choos-
ing finance mechanisms. Additionally, interest can be used to shift income away from U.S. 
debtors to related foreign parties. See I.R.C. § 163(j). 
 291. Section 385 was enacted in 1969 to deal with this issue, but that section is contin-
gent on the issue of regulations, and final regulations have never been issued. 
 292. Expensing of capital expenditures results in “single” taxation of investment re-
turns, whereas the exclusion of borrowing and deduction of interest yield “double” deduc-
tion of interest, viewing both phenomena in present value terms. 
 293. Limiting the current interest deduction to business or investment income, see id. 
§§ 163(d), 469, would fail to solve the arbitrage problem of combining the current treat-
ment of debt with consumption-tax treatment of investments. It might be contended that 
certain interest (e.g., on purchase-money loans used to purchase real estate) should be 
exempt from any disallowance rule, but if borrowed money is truly fungible, then such a 
contention loses force. 
 294. See id. § 1(h)(11). 
 295. See Forum: Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 149-262 (2013) 
(introduction and four articles). 
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significant reduction in the C corporation rate itself operates as a 
form of partial integration. Many of the leading trading partners of 
the U.S. have moved to partial integration systems of various types.  
 Accordingly, a significant reduction in the corporate tax rate 
should be accompanied by restoration of the status of dividends as 
ordinary income. Also, insofar as a capital gains preference for stock 
gains and dividends is justified as a partial integration measure, such 
preference would become redundant to the low corporate tax rate.296 
5.   Repeal the Earnings and Profits Apparatus 
 Under current law, a non-liquidation distribution from a C corpo-
ration is gross income only to the extent it is deemed to come out of 
the corporation’s post-1913 earnings and profits (E & P).297 E & P is a 
financial accounting construct, and one has to make numerous ad-
justments to taxable income to calculate it. Additionally, rules are 
required to determine what distributions reduce E & P.298 These 
rules, which are wholly arbitrary, operate so that a few corporations 
still are deemed to possess pre-1913 E & P.299 The entire E & P sys-
tem is much ado about practically nothing, as the E & P system rarely 
prevents non-liquidation distributions from being taxable dividends. 
 From another angle, the taxation of equity investments should be 
separated from any taxation of the underlying entity. The E & P 
mechanism operates inappropriately as a capital recovery for corpo-
rate equity. Shares of stock are correctly not subject to depreciation, 
because corporate equity has an indefinite useful life. Additionally, 
partial loss deductions are not generally allowed under the income 
tax.300 Thus, recovery of capital under a realization income tax should 
not be allowed unless there is a true disposition of all or a physical 
portion of an asset. Stated in abstract terms, taxation of an invest-
ment should depend only on the investment and its economic return, 
 296. A 1982 study estimated that corporate stocks and bonds accounted for almost 37% 
of total assets for all top wealthholders, closely followed by real estate (gains on which are 
already largely exempt under § 121), with other categories being relatively insignificant. 
See Marvin Schwartz, Estimates of Personal Wealth, 1982: A Second Look, SOI BULL., 
Spring 1988, at 31, 32. Thus, the capital gains (and dividends) tax preference could be 
wholly eliminated, or at least targeted to individuals investing in family-owned businesses. 
 297. Corporate distributions in excess of E & P are tax free due to the shareholder’s 
stock basis offsetting the cash received, and distributions in excess of basis are treated as 
gains from the sale of the stock. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a). 
 298. See id. § 312. 
 299. The general rule is that distributions are deemed to come out of the most-recently-
acquired E & P. See id. § 316(a)(2). This last-in, first-out (LIFO) convention is the opposite 
of the most commonly used convention for inventory, which is first-in, first-out (FIFO). 
 300. See Citizens Bank of Weston v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1958); 
Lakewood Assocs. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 450 (1997); Pulvers v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 
245 (1967), aff’d, 407 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969). 
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not on the remote source of the return.301 The fact that dividends are 
not deductible represents the decision that corporate taxable income 
is a tax base independent from the tax base of the shareholders. (In 
contrast, the net income of a trust or estate is viewed as a pool of in-
come that can only be taxed once.) A (pro rata) non-liquidation distri-
bution is not a disposition of an investment or a portion thereof, but 
only a cash return thereon: the shareholder retains the same right to 
future distributions and same degree of control as existed before. The 
fact that the corporate assets have shrunk in size is immaterial. Such 
shrinking would cause the value of the stock to decrease, but that 
decrease is simply unrealized depreciation, and unrealized deprecia-
tion is not deductible under a realization income tax. The E & P 
mechanism, in short, is contrary to both the realization principle and 
the separation of the corporate and individual income taxes. 
 Accordingly, the E & P apparatus should be jettisoned, and all pro-
rata non-liquidation distributions should be treated as gross income.302 
 The notion of a “partial liquidation” distribution, resulting in a 
basis offset without an actual surrender of stock, could be retained.303 
However, since the same basis offset as is desired in a partial liqui-
dation can be obtained by (1) dropping assets into a newly-created 
controlled corporation, (2) distributing the stock of that corporation to 
the shareholders of the distributing corporation, and (3) liquidating 
the corporation whose stock was distributed,304 the qualification re-
quirements for obtaining a basis offset in a partial liquidation should 
be essentially the same as would qualify a distribution of stock in a 
controlled corporation for tax-free treatment under § 355.305 
 301. Basis recovery in the case of an annuity or a level-payment debt obligation is 
based on the notion that each cash receipt marks the disposition of a component of the 
asset. 
 302. For other critiques of the current system, see William D. Andrews, “Out of Its 
Earnings and Profits”: Some Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
1403 (1956), and Walter J. Blum, The Earnings and Profits Limitation on Dividend In-
come: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXES 68 (1975). 
 303. See I.R.C. § 302(e) (qualified partial liquidation treated as sale of portion of share-
holder’s stock). 
 304. The assets of the terminal business can be placed in a separate corporation tax 
free, id. § 368(a)(1)(D), the stock of which is distributed to the existing shareholders tax 
free, id. § 355, and that corporation can be liquidated in a transaction treated as a sale 
with basis offset, id. § 331(a). 
 305. The three-step transaction described at the beginning of this text sentence 
achieves the same result as a partial liquidation under § 302(e) only if step (2) thereof—the 
distribution of controlled corporation stock—qualifies as a tax-free distribution under 
§ 355. Current § 355, in turn, has various qualification requirements, including (1) the 
distributed corporation must contain assets of an active business that has been carried on 
for at least five years, (2) that business must be carried on immediately after the distribu-
tion, and (3) the transaction must not be a disguised dividend (which would be indicated by 
a prior agreement to sell or liquidate the distributed corporation). See id. § 355(a)(1)(B), (b). 
The requirements of current § 302(e) are more lax, requiring either that a business (carried 
on for five years) be terminated or that the transaction not be essentially the equivalent of 
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 An issue is whether, as a transitional rule, existing corporations 
would be allowed to declare pre-1913 E & P and apply it against the 
first post-enactment dividends until pre-1913 E & P is exhausted. 
However, all current distributions with respect to stock are income to 
the shareholder when received and cannot be pre-1913 income of the 
shareholder. There is no constitutional requirement that dividends 
out of pre-1913 E & P must be exempt, especially since the account-
ing convention that has the effect of preserving pre-1913 E & P is  
arbitrary.306 In fact, Lynch v. Hornby307 held precisely that a post-
1913 dividend paid out of profits accumulated before 1913 could be 
constitutionally taxed.308 Therefore, any such transition rule would be 
unnecessary and, in my view, unwarranted. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The emphasis here has been on proposals that fit into a realiza-
tion income tax, which would simplify compliance and administration 
for the bulk of individual taxpayers. The proposals made herein 
(some original, some not) advance only some simplification moves 
among the many that are possible. Other kinds of proposals can be 
imagined, such as simplifying depreciation accounting (or eliminat-
ing depreciation altogether). International taxation is another area 
that is only lightly considered herein. 
 Tax academics are often skeptical of a simplification agenda. Tax 
law, as well as life itself, is complex, and tax professionals thrive on 
complexity. Thus, we tax professionals have a vested interest in the 
fact that we have mastered the intricacies of the tax law, which is a 
major component of our human capital. But we tend to overlook the 
fact that tax law is not self-executing. Accordingly, we tend to overes-
timate the ability of the IRS and the general population to follow 
what we have wrought. In any event, the simplification agenda is not 
necessarily bad news for tax professionals. The reader will have un-
doubtedly noted that many of the proposals made herein are not fully 
developed and would require further working out. Some may even 
turn out to be non-viable from the simplification angle itself. Tax pro-
fessionals should be as good at creating simple, workable solutions to 
a dividend at the corporate level (meaning, in effect, that a meaningful contraction of the 
corporation’s business occurred). 
 306. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), construed the 1909 corporate 
income tax to exclude pre-enactment appreciation. However, since a tax on gross receipts 
(without basis offset) is constitutional as an indirect tax, basis recovery cannot be constitu-
tionally required. See Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation 
to the Taxation of Non-Excludable Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369, 401-07 
(2007).  
 307. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918).  
 308. I.R.C. § 316(a)(1), excluding distributions from pre-1913 E & P, is, therefore, not 
constitutionally required. 
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existing complexities as they are at mastering existing ones. It is cer-
tainly a lot more enjoyable. 
 
 
 
